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ABSTRACT 
The prominence of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) has increased 
dramatically in the last decade triggering concerns over the accountability of 
these organisations. In response, NGOs have broadened their accountability 
systems to include all their stakeholders, not only those who hold some form of 
authority over them. Particular attention has been given to ensuring 
accountability to the recipients of an NGO‟s assistance, known in some circles 
as „beneficiary accountability‟. However, the implementation of beneficiary 
accountability is particularly difficult in the kind of environment in which 
humanitarian assistance is provided – a point which is acknowledged in 
literature. The aim of this research was to understand the factors that influenced 
the implementation and the reasons for the difficulty. 
The case study employed qualitative methods to gather data from NGO staff 
and members of two Dinka communities in South Sudan. The study found that 
the complexity of accountability was not given sufficient consideration during 
implementation. Within the task-oriented environment of humanitarian aid, 
accountability was simplified into a set of practical steps. But while staff 
implemented the steps, they often missed the real essence of accountability. As 
a result, the mechanisms employed were not entirely appropriate for the target 
audience, the Dinka communities. Perhaps because of this, the community 
tended to prefer their own methods of holding the NGO to account.  
The research concludes that because of certain structural difficulties inherent in 
beneficiary accountability it is not only difficult, but impossible to implement 
within certain contexts. It is recommended that NGOs make changes to the 
methodology they employ when working in a context similar to the one in which 
the research was conducted. 
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GLOSSARY OF TERMS 
Area Coordinator: The most senior manager at a project site. 
Field staff: Staff who were based at one of the project sites rather than at head 
office. 
KAP survey: These surveys were conducted among the recipient communities. 
They were used to measure the changes in the community‟s knowledge, 
attitudes and practices. The information gathered was used to guide 
programmatic decisions and to measure progress. 
Local staff: Staff recruited from within the immediate area of a project site. 
Payam: Government administrative area in South Sudan.  
PHCU/C: In South Sudan, there were three types of health care facilities: 
Primary Health Care Units, Primary Health Care Centres and Hospitals. Both 
the PHCUs and PHCCs were clinics which provided basic treatment and 
screening but the PHCCs were better equipped and offered more services. 
Programme Director: The most senior manager within a programme, for 
example the South Sudan Programme. Most other NGOs call this position 
Country Director or Chief of Party. 
Relocatable staff: Refers to Sudanese staff who were recruited from a different 
part of the country than the project site. Like the expatriate staff, they were 
housed in Tearfund‟s compound and were therefore eligible for relocation in the 
event of a security incident or illness, for example. 
SSRRC: This commission was set up to oversee the work of NGOs. They 
provided a link between the community and the NGOs. In 2010, the GoSS set 
up the Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs and Disaster Management and the 
commission became a part of that ministry. 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Background 
From the recognition of humanitarian organisations by the Geneva Convention 
of 1864 (Hilhorst, 2002) until the present, the number and prominence of 
humanitarian actors has increased dramatically. For example, it was estimated 
that more than 200 non-governmental organisations1 (NGOs) responded to the 
Rwandan crisis in 1994 (Steering Committee of the Joint Evaluation of 
Emergency Assistance to Rwanda, 1996). In comparison, various reports 
estimate that anywhere from 3,000 to 10,000 NGOs responded to the Haiti 
earthquake in 2010.  
Similarly, funding to NGOs has increased within the last decade. According to 
data from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD), NGOs and civil society received 1 million United States Dollars (USD) 
in 2002. In 2009, the disbursement was USD 17.7 billion2. 
In addition to their increase in numbers and funding, NGOs have gained 
influence through engaging in advocacy at local, national and international 
levels. One of the most significant examples was the inclusion of international 
NGOs in the Ottawa Convention Banning Landmines in 1999. This was the first 
time that NGOs were part of an international lawmaking process (Anderson, 
2000). And this inclusion of NGOs in high level, international discussions has 
continued. For example, in November 2011 NGOs took part in the OECD‟s High 
Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness as equal contributors alongside donors and 
governments (BetterAid Coalition, 2011). 
This growing prominence has raised questions about the legitimacy and 
accountability of these organisations (Brown, 2007). Similar to the public and 
                                            
1
 A definition of NGOs is given in the context chapter, see page 11.  
2
 Data is taken from OECD’s Creditor Reporting System (CRS). Query used Official Development 
Assistance through the channel of NGOs and civil society. Amounts were shown as disbursements in 
USD millions (current value).  
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business sectors, NGOs have had to respond by broadening their accountability 
(Slim, 2002) beyond conventional reporting.  
NGO accountability is now equated with improving performance (Raynard, 
2000), ensuring that responsibilities are fulfilled (Davis, 2007), demonstrating 
adequate management of resources (Bendell, 2006) and proving that aid is 
meeting the needs of the recipients (Hilhorst, 2002) 
One aspect of this broadened accountability is known as „humanitarian‟ or 
„beneficiary‟ accountability. (Throughout this research, the term „beneficiary 
accountability‟ is used but terminology is discussed further in the Literature 
review and Findings chapters.) 
1.2 Beneficiary accountability 
Because NGOs have multiple stakeholders, those interests must somehow be 
prioritised when mapping the organisation‟s accountability (Slim, 2002). This is 
extremely difficult and mechanisms of accountability3 to donors have tended to 
be better developed than those to beneficiaries (Hilhorst, 2002; Brown, 2007). 
This was made clear by the findings of the Joint Evaluation of Emergency 
Assistance to Rwanda, a report published in March 1996. One of the 
recommendations of the report was that organisations should strengthen their 
systems of accountability, including to the recipients of their assistance 
(Steering Committee of the Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to 
Rwanda, 1996). In response to the recommendations of the report, a number of 
joint initiatives were undertaken by humanitarian organisations. One of those 
initiatives resulted in the formation of the Humanitarian Accountability 
Partnership (known as HAP); an international, self-regulatory body (Callamard, 
2006). HAP requires their member NGOs to make themselves accountable to 
their beneficiaries - hence the term „beneficiary accountability‟. 
                                            
3
 Variations of the phrase ‘accountability mechanisms’ are common throughout literature and refer to 
the systems, procedures or measures which are put in place to ensure accountability. 
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1.3 Problem statement 
However, as attractive as beneficiary accountability sounds, the implementation 
of this broader accountability is particularly difficult for international 
organisations who are working in crisis-affected areas (Davis, 2007). 
Accountability is a complex concept which is influenced by culture and context 
and typically, NGOs providing emergency assistance don‟t have the time to 
navigate these complexities. 
To assist with these challenges, HAP developed a standard and later, an audit 
process. Organisations that successfully undergo the audit attain HAP-
certification. But difficulties remain, as shown in the Findings chapter: There is a 
gap between the concept and the day-to-day implementation. This leads to two 
questions: 
1. Can an organisation certified by HAP truly claim to be accountable 
to their beneficiaries? 
2. Are the mechanisms implemented in the name of beneficiary 
accountability appreciated by the beneficiaries themselves or are 
they more attractive to the donors and supporters of the NGO?   
In order to answer these two questions, it is necessary to understand the 
concept of accountability, specifically beneficiary accountability; the way it is 
implemented; what challenges exist; and what views are held by the 
beneficiaries. 
1.4 Aim and objectives 
Aim: To analyse the factors influencing the implementation of beneficiary 
accountability in an NGO‟s relief programme in two Dinka communities in South 
Sudan. 
Objectives: 
1. To understand the overall concept of „accountability‟.  
 4 
2. To examine how the specific context affects implementation. 
3. To document the process of implementation, identifying the factors that 
influence it in two sites in Northern Bahr el Ghazal, South Sudan. 
4. To identify common perceptions of beneficiary accountability held by NGO 
staff and beneficiary communities in the research area. 
5. To make recommendations that will increase the effectiveness of 
accountability measures.  
1.5 Scope of the research 
Although beneficiary accountability may not be a familiar term to some people, 
the expanse of literature on NGO accountability, including beneficiary 
accountability, and the wider accountability debate is quite considerable. As a 
result, there were a number of possible contexts and foci for this research even 
within the specific aim. Therefore, the boundaries of this study are as follows: 
 In the literature, there are clear links between „accountability‟ and „quality‟ 
(in this case, the quality of aid delivered). But since „quality‟ is a debate in 
itself, doing justice to the link would require dedicated research which 
was not the aim of this work. Many of the articles mentioned in both the 
References and Bibliography contain more information on this much 
broader topic. 
 Similarly, the research recognises the overlaps between accountability 
and participation and briefly discusses participation but this discussion is 
limited. Again, more information is available through the referenced 
material. 
 This was not intended to be an anthropological study and although 
certain aspects are brought in, such as culture, they are not dealt with in 
great depth. 
 The context for the study is very specific: an international NGO delivering 
humanitarian services in a post-conflict, complex emergency setting (see 
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Chapter 2 for further detail). This focus was chosen in order to achieve 
the depth of information required. 
1.6 Thesis structure 
The thesis has seven chapters including this one: 
Chapter 2 describes the specific context within which the research was carried 
out. This covers three areas: South Sudan, Tearfund (the NGO who facilitated 
the research) and HAP. 
Chapter 3 draws on the considerable literature available on the subject of 
accountability to define the word and then to discuss its application to NGOs. 
Within this, the complexity and challenges of „beneficiary accountability‟ are 
highlighted and the views of beneficiaries themselves are summarised. Some 
aspects of the Dinka culture which are particularly relevant to this research are 
presented. This chapter contributes to the achievement of objectives 1 and 2. 
Chapter 4 explains the methodology used in the research and reflects on the 
author‟s role in influencing and interpreting the findings. 
Chapter 5 presents the primary data gathered. This chapter describes the 
implementation; outlines the challenges identified by interviewees and presents 
the views of the beneficiaries. Together with Chapter 6, this achieves objectives 
3 and 4. 
Chapter 6 discusses the complexity of the concept and identifies some of the 
structural problems with beneficiary accountability. Answers to the original 
research questions are offered by way of a conclusion. 
Chapter 7 concludes the research by making recommendations for readers, in 
particular, NGOs. This chapter fulfils objective 5. 
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2 Context 
Since the research was carried out within a very specific context, this chapter 
provides information which enables interpretation of the findings and 
comparison to other contexts. There are three sections covering South Sudan4, 
Tearfund and HAP.  
2.1 South Sudan 
2.1.1 The political context 
Sudan‟s civil war lasted for 21 years, ending with the Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement (CPA) in January 2005. This was signed between the National 
Congress Party (NCP), the ruling party based in Khartoum, and the southern 
based Sudan People‟s Liberation Movement (SPLM) (Economist, 2010). This 
interim agreement devolved a limited autonomy to the Government of Southern 
Sudan (GoSS) and paved the way for elections and a referendum in January 
2011, in which Southerners voted for secession from the north. The new 
Republic of South Sudan was declared on the 9th July 2011. 
Although a turbulent time politically, the research sites were relatively peaceful 
and there was little disruption to project activities during the research period. 
Generally, the GoSS supported the work of NGOs and were happy to assist 
with this research. 
2.1.2 The humanitarian context – a complex emergency 
The years of war and lack of investment in the south left a virtually non-existent 
infrastructure, high levels of malnutrition and morbidity, and very low levels of 
education. In spite of the CPA, little development took place in the south 
between 2005 and 2010. Most development that did take place was in the 
                                            
4
 As of 9 July 2011, what was formerly Southern Sudan became the Republic of South Sudan. For 
consistency sake, this document refers to South Sudan unless there is a specific reason to make a 
distinction. 
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capital, Juba, or other urban centres, leaving the majority of the population 
untouched (Mailer and Poole, 2010).  
The following statistics, which were accurate at the end of 2010, highlight the 
humanitarian needs in South Sudan (Reliefweb, 2010): 
 50.6% of the population lived on less than 1 USD a day. (Southern 
Sudan Centre for Census Statistics and Evaluation, 2010) 
 Only about 10% of children were fully vaccinated.5 
 According to reports by local authorities and/or assessment teams 
approximately 215,000 people were newly displaced by inter-ethnic or 
armed conflicts in South Sudan between January and the end of October 
2010. 
 85% of adults did not know how to read or write.6 
 South Sudan, which is roughly the size of France, had a road network of 
approximately 7,500 kilometres but less than half that was open all year 
round7. This was in comparison to France‟s road network of a little over 1 
million kilometres8. 
In August 2009, the UN Deputy Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator for 
Southern Sudan opened a press conference with the following words: ―The best 
way to characterize the humanitarian situation in Southern Sudan is as a 
‗humanitarian perfect storm‘‖ (Grande, 2009, p.1).  
In December 2010, there were approximately 140 international NGOs9 
responding to the situation in South Sudan and their work reflected the 
complexity of the humanitarian situation because most projects combined 
aspects of emergency relief with longer term development work. In this setting, 
                                            
5
 WHO Report 2010 
6
 Alternative Education Systems Unit in the Ministry of Education, UNESCO 2008 
7
 Consolidated Appeals Process (CAP): Workplan for Sudan 2010, UNOCHA 
8
 Data taken from OECD International Traffic Safety Data and Analysis Group (IRTAD) 
9
 Figure provided by the NGO Forum Secretariat in South Sudan.  
 9 
the time-pressures associated with relief work are combined with the need for 
longer term solutions. So there was a high turnover of staff, on one or two year 
contracts, commensurate with a relief setting but at the same time, projects 
sometimes continued in the same community for several years, which was more 
similar to a development setting. This was the case in the two research sites. 
2.1.3 Northern Bahr el Ghazal 
The research was conducted in Northern Bahr el Ghazal State (see Figure 1) 
which had a population of just under 721,00010 and was the poorest state in 
South Sudan with 75.6% of the population living below the poverty line (1 USD 
a day) (Southern Sudan Centre for Census Statistics and Evaluation, 2010). 
The predominant tribe living in the area was the Dinka Malual. A Nilotic people, 
the Dinka were the largest tribe in South Sudan, accounting for about 10% of 
the population. There is additional contextual information on the Dinka people 
provided in the Literature review chapter (see Section 3.3). 
                                            
10
 According to the 2008 contested census figures 
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Figure 1: Map showing the location of the field sites where research was conducted and the programme head quarters in Juba 
(red dots) 
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2.2 Tearfund 
Tearfund is a UK-based international NGO, established in 1968. In this thesis, 
the term „NGO‟ refers to service-delivery NGOs, specifically those providing 
humanitarian assistance during or after an emergency. However, in general, the 
term refers to organisations which are private, non-profit, often non-membership 
and self-governing (Jordan and Van Tuijl, 2006). NGOs work at a local, national 
or international level. Their work is in areas such as relief, development, peace 
building, human rights, environment and conservation (ibid.).  
Tearfund is one of the UK‟s largest international relief and development 
organisations, working in over 50 countries around the world. They first began 
working in South Sudan in 1970 by providing support to local NGOs with whom 
they partnered. This work was expanded when the operational relief team, 
known as the Disaster Management Team (DMT), responded to the famine in 
Northern Bahr el Ghazal in 1998. Since then, the organisation has continued to 
provide assistance both through support to partner organisations and direct 
implementation.  
Tearfund was well known in the research area because of the length of time 
they had worked in Northern Bahr el Ghazal. In one of the sites, a local trader 
said, ―Tearfund was the first to come here and we appreciate this‖ (27:6)11. 
2.2.1 The programme at the time of the research 
In 2010, the operational programme had an annual budget of approximately $5 
million USD and employed some 400 staff. As mentioned in Section 2.1.2, the 
programme was a combination of emergency relief and longer term 
development interventions. Tearfund had four operational field sites across 
three states: Northern Bahr el Ghazal (two sites), Upper Nile and Jonglei. The 
main support office was based in Juba which provided managerial, technical, 
financial, logistic and human resource support to the field sites. The research 
                                            
11
 Throughout the thesis, references to primary data sources are represented as numbers in brackets. 
This is explained in Section 4.2.1.1, page 39.  
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was conducted in Northern Bahr el Ghazal in the counties of Aweil East and 
Aweil South (see Figure 1). 
2.2.1.1 The project in Aweil East 
In Aweil East, the project provided primary health care, clean water and safe 
sanitation facilities and hygiene promotion (known as WASH) and supported the 
development of livelihoods. The budget was approximately USD 1.3 million per 
annum which was funded by one donor during the research period. As of 
August 200912, the project employed 105 staff of which 93 were local staff 
members, 9 were relocatable and 3 were expatriate staff. 
2.2.1.2 The project in Aweil South 
In August 2009, the project activities were the same as those in Aweil East with 
the addition of the treatment of acute malnutrition. This was funded by two 
different donors: one covering primary health care and another covering WASH, 
nutrition and livelihoods. The total combined annual budget was approximately 
USD 2.4 million per annum and the project employed 166 staff as of May 
200912, 150 of which were local to the project area, 11 were relocatable and 5 
were expatriate staff. 
In August 2009, a decision was made to hand the primary health care work over 
to another NGO and this took place in February 2010. Since the salaries for the 
staff responsible for beneficiary accountability were covered by the health care 
project budget, after February 2010, the project had no dedicated 
„accountability‟ staff. This is discussed further in Section 5.1.2. 
                                            
12
 This was the most recent data available. 
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2.3 HAP 
2.3.1 Background 
In 1996, the evaluation of the response to the Rwandan crisis (Steering 
Committee of the Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda, 1996) 
identified a number of failures in the relief effort. These included: 
 Relief agency13 personnel had very limited understanding of Rwandan 
social structures and as a result, didn‟t take into account the views of the 
beneficiaries in the design or implementation of the programmes (Study 
III, Chapter 7).  
 Refugees receiving assistance had no access to an independent body 
with which they could raise issues or request information (Study III, 
Chapter 7). 
 Agencies lacked sufficient capacity to respond. This included 
appropriately qualified staff, specialist equipment, sufficient quantities of 
emergency goods, etc. This lack of capacity did not stop agencies from 
responding, it just reduced the quality of the response (Study III, Chapter 
8). 
 There was a lack of coordination between the agencies which resulted in 
duplication of effort and a waste of resources (Study III, Chapter 8). 
 The report found that a significant number of NGOs had not worked in 
Africa before and many had not worked in an emergency response 
(Study III, Chapter 8). 
―It is unacceptable that a NGO with little or no relevant experience is able to 
send personnel to a humanitarian relief operation and engage in activities that 
discredit or undermine the overall effort; provide unacceptably poor standards of 
                                            
13
 The word ‘agency’ is used to indicate both NGOs and UN agencies. 
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service and care to their beneficiaries; and then leave without any recourse.‖ 
(ibid., Study III, Chapter 8, p. 5). 
The report was careful to point out that not all NGOs performed poorly but it 
made it clear that measures must be put in place to stop poor performance in 
future humanitarian crises. One of the suggested ways to achieve this was to 
strengthen systems of accountability (ibid., Study III, Chapter 9). The report 
emphasised the need for NGOs to ensure that they made themselves 
accountable to both the recipients of their assistance and their donors (ibid.). 
The Rwandan report was not the only trigger for the emergence of beneficiary 
accountability as a priority among NGOs but it is one of the most significant.  
2.3.2 HAP is formed 
In response to the report, discussions were held among agencies which 
resulted in the formation of several joint initiatives. One of these was HAP, an 
international, self-regulatory body that was registered in Geneva in 2003. HAP 
was the product of research, discussions and consultations on the humanitarian 
accountability gaps (HAP International, 2011b) identified by the report. 
The stated mission of HAP is ―...to make humanitarian action accountable to its 
intended beneficiaries through self-regulation, compliance verification and 
quality assurance certification‖ (HAP International, 2011a). HAP‟s emphasis on 
beneficiary accountability was intended to address the imbalance of NGO 
accountability which previously favoured the more powerful stakeholders like 
the donors.  
2.3.2.1 The HAP Standards 
Initially, HAP developed a set of 7 principles which outlined good practice in 
accountability for organisations delivering humanitarian assistance (HAP 
International, 2011c). These were further developed in 2007 into a standard 
which included benchmarks and indicators to measure achievement (ibid.). A 
review was conducted which resulted in the 2010 edition of the HAP Standard 
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in Accountability and Quality Management being released in January 2011. The 
benchmarks are as follows: 
1. The organisation sets out the commitments that it will be held 
accountable for, and how they will be delivered. 
2. The organisation ensures that staff have competencies that 
enable them to meet the organisation‘s commitments. 
3. The organisation ensures that the people it aims to assist and 
other stakeholders have access to timely, relevant and clear 
information about the organisation and its activities. 
4. The organisation listens to the people it aims to assist, 
incorporating their views and analysis in programme decisions. 
5. The organisation enables the people it aims to assist and other 
stakeholders to raise complaints and receive a response through 
an effective, accessible and safe process. 
6. The organisation learns from experience to continually improve its 
performance (HAP International, 2010a, p. 11). 
The correlation with some of the points raised by the Rwandan evaluation report 
is easy to see.  
Having developed the standards, HAP went on to develop a system for 
certification. In this process, an agency is assessed for compliance against the 
standards (HAP International, 2011b). Certification is granted for a period of 
three years and it includes a mid-term evaluation to measure progress. 
At the time of this research, HAP‟s membership had reached 77 organisations 
from 23 countries; Tearfund was one of only 11 organisations to have achieved 
HAP certification. 
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3 Literature review 
3.1 Introduction 
The volume and diversity of literature discussing accountability is in itself a hint 
of the popularity and complexity of the topic. Authors agree that it is a fluid 
concept which is difficult to define and even more difficult to put into practice. 
Nevertheless, the literature shows that it is much sought-after in all sectors 
including among NGOs whose variety of stakeholders make accountability a 
particular challenge to implement. 
3.2 Accountability 
3.2.1 Defining accountability 
Accountability has its origins in the idea of personal freedom and the ensuing 
responsibility (Davis, 2007). Its political origins are traced to the Athenian state 
which was the first record of a political society where accountability was 
automatically required from delegated authority (Day and Klein, 1987). Today 
this concept, central to public administration, has been exported to all sectors 
(Anheier and Hawkes, 2009). 
 ―Given the widespread acceptance of accountability, it is surprisingly difficult to 
find a common definition of what it means.‖ (Davis, 2007, p. 3). 
 While I share this sentiment, as do a number of others (Raynard, 2000; Day 
and Klein, 1987; Koppell, 2005; Sinclair, 1995; Schedler, 1999), perhaps the 
difficulty is that accountability is a broad concept that is applied in a wide range 
of scenarios (Hall et al., 2007). Trying to include all that the word means in a 
single definition may confuse, rather than clarify the meaning (Koppell, 2005). In 
addition, the definition has expanded considerably in recent years, obscuring 
the original meaning (Mulgan, 2000). Accountability is given extra dimensions 
by its context; it is chameleon-like (Sinclair, 1995). Perhaps for these reasons, 
the English word has no direct equivalent in most other languages and when 
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there is a similar word, it tends to lack the same breadth (Dubnick, 1998). 
Therefore, in this chapter, the different aspects that either make up or influence 
the English word „accountability‟ are presented. This method has been chosen 
in order to convey the complexity and scope of the word. 
There are two main parts of accountability: answerability and enforceability 
(Schedler, 1999; de Renzio and Mulley, 2006). 
3.2.1.1 Answerability 
―To account is to answer for the discharge of a duty or for conduct...It is to give 
a satisfactory reason for or to explain.‖ (Day and Klein, 1987, p. 5). 
Answerability implies that A will answer to B for decisions or actions taken but, 
in order to do that, B must take part in the determination of the acceptable 
standards for A‟s behaviour or actions (Rubenstein, 2007). Put simply, there 
must be shared expectations (Day and Klein, 1987). The agreement as to what 
constitutes acceptable behaviour is a crucial point, as will be shown. Mulgan  
(2000) states that answerability is the original and core meaning of 
accountability.  
Answerability, in turn, implies, or is made up of the following three concepts: 
Responsibility; transparency; responsiveness. 
Responsibility is defined in the Concise Oxford Dictionary as ―having an 
obligation to do something‖ (Soanes and Stevenson, 2008). Unless there is an 
obligation to do something, it is not necessary to be answerable (Day and Klein, 
1987). By way of illustration, while giving an account may be in order to 
determine blameworthiness, blame can only be attributed if responsibility is first 
established (Blatz, 1972, quoted in Velayutham and Perera, 2004).  
Essential to the process of giving account, is transparency (Velayutham and 
Perera, 2004), or the willingness to disclose information. The processes of audit 
and evaluation are those by which outputs are made transparent for the sake of 
holding people or organisations to account (Strathern, 2000; Uphoff, 1995). 
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Although not often mentioned, responsiveness is frequently implied by 
answerability. A system of accountability should not only give an account but 
also be responsive to the expressed needs of the stakeholders (Arens, 2005), 
for example, by replying to a query or incorporating suggestions. 
3.2.1.2 Enforceability 
―The term accountability...denotes the mechanisms through which people 
entrusted with power are kept under check to make sure that they do not abuse 
it, and that they carry out their duties effectively.‖  (de Renzio and Mulley, 2006, 
p. 1). This refers to the evaluation of actions and decisions and the likelihood 
that there will be sanction or reward as a result (Hall et al., 2007). Essentially, 
merely reporting on performance, or the lack of it, does not constitute 
accountability – there must be liability (Davis, 2007; Koppell, 2005; Rubenstein, 
2007). Tetlock, (1992) (as quoted in Gelfand and Realo, 1999, p. 722) puts it as 
follows, ―...accountability is fundamentally a norm enforcement mechanism‖. 
Although some authors, for example Schedler (1999), contend that 
enforceability is not an essential part of accountability, most others feel that it is 
essential (Brown, 2007; Raynard, 2000; Davis, 2007; Koppell, 2005; de Renzio 
and Mulley, 2006; Rubenstein, 2007; Reyes, 2009). Having reviewed the 
literature, I share the latter view: Answerability becomes accountability only 
when enforceability is also present. 
Closely linked to enforceability is the dynamic of power. Without recognising 
and understanding power as a dimension of all human relationships, especially 
in terms of inequality in relationships, it is difficult to fully understand 
accountability (Callamard, 2001). The inevitable role of power in all relationships 
is one of the drivers of accountability (Davis, 2007; HAP International, 2008). 
HAP defines accountability as ―the responsible use of power‖ (HAP 
International, 2008, p. 2).  
What is of particular relevance to this research is that enforcement becomes 
difficult when the one giving account is more powerful than the one to whom an 
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account is due (Hilhorst, 2002; Rubenstein, 2007; Kilby, 2006). This asymmetry 
is discussed further with regard to beneficiary accountability in Section 
3.2.3.1.2. 
3.2.1.3 Other important influencing factors 
In discussing accountability, authors also identified a number of other aspects 
which either define or influence accountability. Two of these are specifically 
relevant here: Culture and trust.  
Culture: The definition of accountability given by Gelfand et al. (2004, p. 137) 
is: ―...we define accountability as the perception of being answerable for actions 
or decisions, in accordance with interpersonal, social, and structural 
contingencies, all of which are embedded in particular sociocultural contexts.‖ 
Essentially, since the concept is socially derived, it will vary between different 
cultural contexts (Sinclair, 1995; Gelfand et al., 2004; Jordan, 2000), which is a 
vital consideration for NGOs who work internationally. This is one of the most 
important points in this research and will be discussed in more detail in Section 
3.2.3.1.1. 
Trust: It has been said that accountability implies mistrust (Wenar, 2006; Chew 
and Greer, 1997; Freeman et al., 2009) but at the same time, it is the means by 
which trust is encouraged. (Strathern, 2000, p. 310) expresses this paradox as 
follows: ―As the term accountability implies, people want to know how to trust 
one another, to make their trust visible, while (knowing that) the very desire to 
do so points to the absence of trust.‖  
In a lot of literature, authors shy away from offering a definition and focus on 
discussing the desirability of accountability. Considering the different facets of 
the word, this is understandable: 
 Accountability is complex and difficult to define and despite its apparent 
desirability, it is an elusive concept (Sklar, 1999) (emphasis added). 
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3.2.1.4 Types of accountability 
Another layer of complexity is added in the implementation. The literature 
identifies a number of different types of accountability, which are implemented 
in different ways. Three types are discussed here: Managerial, moral and 
professional accountability. 
Firstly, is what Day and Klein (1987) call „managerial accountability‟. This is 
primarily about ensuring that delegated authority performs according to agreed 
parameters. In short, it is about making performance visible thus allowing for 
control from a distance (Hilhorst, 2003). 
The technical systems of managerial accountability typically include formal 
mechanisms such as audit, evaluation or the administrative process of handling 
an individual grievance (Day and Klein, 1987). It is essential that responsibilities 
are clear and they are usually documented, for example in job descriptions or 
procedural manuals. This type of accountability is often viewed as a logical, 
systematic process (Velayutham and Perera, 2004; Hilhorst, 2003) and it is 
assumed that it can be implemented in any governance structure. 
Another, quite different type is moral accountability (Day and Klein, 1987; 
Hilhorst, 2003; Edwards and Hulme, 1995). This is ―seen as being answerable 
for following a certain set of moral precepts or rules of conduct.‖ (Day and Klein, 
1987, p. 24). Although these rules of conduct may be written and clearly 
formulated, they may also be undocumented, unarticulated rules that are 
nevertheless commonly known and understood (Hilhorst, 2003). As a result it is 
very likely that the mechanisms of moral accountability will be informal: ―What 
the report and statistical record are to rational [managerial] accountability, 
stories, ironic remarks and gossip are to moral accountability.‖ (ibid., p. 127) 
The third type is professional accountability. The most easily understood 
example of this is in the medical profession where accountability of a medical 
practitioner is to peers; the profession itself sets the rules and provides the 
oversight (Day and Klein, 1987).  
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The complexity of accountability, both the definition and the implementation, 
becomes even more apparent within the NGO sector. 
3.2.2 NGO accountability 
There are a number of diverse factors which have led to the prominence of the 
accountability debate and NGOs have found themselves involved both as those 
calling for greater accountability and those being targeted by such calls (Lee, 
2004). 
According to the Edelman Trust Barometer in 2010 and 2011 (Edelman, 2010; 
Edelman, 2011), NGOs are the institutions most trusted by the informed public 
of most of the Western world. This public believes that NGOs advance the 
common good and therefore, that companies in partnership with NGOs have a 
better chance of solving global challenges like climate change and poverty 
(Edelman, 2010). However, studies done in developing countries are not always 
this positive: there are fewer regulations for NGOs and a large portion of the 
population don‟t fully understand the sector (Gugerty, 2009). 
But regardless of trust ratings, NGOs increasingly find themselves facing 
questions about their legitimacy and accountability (Slim, 2002). In some cases, 
these questions are either a backlash against, or a diversion from the pressure 
brought to bear by the advocacy campaigns of NGOs (Jordan, 2000). In other 
cases, there are well-founded reasons, for example, the Rwandan report. 
In order to indicate their trustworthiness, NGOs, like organisations in other 
sectors, have needed to develop their accountability beyond the traditional view 
that only those with authority over the organisation had the right to ask for an 
account (Lee, 2004). Typically, this had involved reporting on money raised, the 
amount spent and the ratio spent on administration (Slim, 2002) – the fiscal side 
of managerial accountability. 
The ―‗new‘ NGO accountability‖, as (Lee, 2004, p. 6) calls it, includes all 
stakeholders not just those with authority over the NGO. This expansion of 
accountability to all stakeholders is extremely complex because of conflicting 
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demands among the stakeholders (Hilhorst, 2002; Brown, 2007; Slim, 2002; 
Koppell, 2005; Hall et al., 2007; Edwards and Hulme, 1995; Lee, 2004; 
Charnovitz, 2006). In consideration of this, the literature refers to different 
directions of accountability (Wenar, 2006) by speaking of horizontal and vertical 
(Sklar, 1999), upward and downward (Larose and Adams, 2002), inward and 
outward (Brown, 2007) accountability. 
Unlike businesses, NGOs have no clear owners (Anheier and Hawkes, 2009). 
So while businesses are primarily accountable to their shareholders and 
owners, and governments are accountable to voters, it is not immediately clear 
which of the stakeholders is due primary accountability from an NGO (Brown, 
2007; Edwards and Hulme, 1995; Lee, 2004; Desai and Howes, 1995).  
Further complication arises from the fact that the different stakeholders require 
different types of accountability. So while the board of directors for an NGO may 
require managerial accountability from staff, standards bodies such as HAP 
hold member organisations accountable to codes and principles through a type 
of professional accountability. 
Oxfam‟s principle of accountability shows their awareness of the multiple 
directions and types of accountability: ―We hold ourselves primarily accountable 
to people living in poverty, but we take our accountability to all stakeholders 
seriously, and continuously strive to balance their different needs.‖14 Just as 
Oxfam prioritises people living in poverty, one of the distinguishing factors in the 
development of HAP was the prioritisation of beneficiaries over other 
stakeholders in NGO accountability frameworks (HAP International, 2011c). 
3.2.3 Beneficiary accountability 
Beneficiary accountability recognises that those in need of assistance have the 
fundamental right to receive assistance but they have limited power over the 
type of assistance they receive (Callamard, 2006). This recognition is 
foundational to the development of beneficiary accountability systems (Raynard, 
                                            
14
 Oxfam document: Matrix – Accountability to People and Communities 
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2000) as reflected by HAP‟s statement, ―In every humanitarian transaction there 
is an imbalance of circumstantial power between those able to give help and 
those in urgent need of assistance.‖ (HAP International, 2008, p. 3).  
There are a number of terms that are used to describe an NGO‟s accountability 
to their beneficiaries, including „beneficiary accountability‟, „downward 
accountability‟, „humanitarian accountability‟ and more recently, „accountability 
to the people the organisation aims to assist‟. Opinions on these terms are 
given in Chapter 5 but throughout this thesis, the term „beneficiary15 
accountability‟ is used. This is not an indication of preference; it is simply 
because that was the term most familiar to Tearfund‟s staff at the time of the 
research.  
The term refers to the efforts made by an organisation to make themselves 
accountable to the people they aim to assist (HAP International, 2008). 
Tearfund defines beneficiary accountability as ―a measure of the quality of the 
relationship between the NGO and the beneficiary‖.16 For Tearfund, a HAP-
certified NGO, the accountability mechanisms implemented correlate to the 
HAP benchmarks. This is documented in detail in the Findings chapter but it 
includes systems like complaints procedures, methods used to share 
information with stakeholders and procedures to monitor and report on 
performance (also see Appendix D). 
One of these systems (correlating to HAP Benchmark 4) is „participation‟, a 
word used to describe a certain type of approach employed in development 
work. Participatory approaches involve beneficiaries in the implementation of 
projects with the aim of incorporating local knowledge and preferences; 
ensuring community engagement which increases the likelihood that activities 
will be sustained beyond the end of the project; and empowering communities 
who would otherwise be passive recipients of aid (Chambers, 1997). Going 
back to the Rwandan report, the failure to employ participatory processes by 
                                            
15
 Anderson (2009, p. 97) offers a good summary of the most common words used by humanitarians for 
‘beneficiaries’ and the implications or connotations of each. 
16
 Tearfund’s Quality Standards Field Guide  
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some agencies was cited as a major cause of failure (Steering Committee of the 
Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda, 1996).  
Once called the new paradigm of development (Chambers, 1997), participatory 
approaches migrated into relief work and became what Cleaver (2001, p. 36) 
calls an ―act of faith‖ – something that NGO staff believe in and don‟t question. 
However recently, there have been some very valid criticisms of the processes 
which are used in participatory approaches (for example see Cooke and Kothari 
(2001)). While these are not discussed here, it is worth noting that the majority 
of the concerns relate to implementation; there is a gap between concept and 
practice. In this, there is a parallel between participation and beneficiary 
accountability. 
3.2.3.1 Challenges to implementation of beneficiary accountability 
While discussing the value and need for accountability to communities receiving 
aid, authors also highlight quite a number of challenges and almost all 
acknowledge the difficulty in finding solutions to these challenges.  
3.2.3.1.1 Culture 
As already mentioned, culture is an influencing factor in the interpretation of 
accountability (see Section 3.2.1.3). Since NGO staff may be from a number of 
different cultures (for example, see footnote number 22 on page 54), they need 
to understand how to traverse the different cultural configurations of 
accountability (Gelfand et al., 2004) if they are to implement it. More 
importantly, accountability mechanisms need to be culturally appropriate for the 
beneficiaries (Hilhorst, 2002). But the practicality of this is easier achieved in a 
development context than it is in the provision of humanitarian aid because of 
the time constraints in the latter (The Listening Project, 2008a). Understanding 
cultures and their systems of accountability takes time but the importance of 
doing so cannot be over-emphasised. 
Culture affects the likelihood of accountability mechanisms being successful. 
Velayutham and Perera (2004) studied the influence of emotions on 
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accountability, in particular guilt and shame. These two emotions are closely 
linked to culture: As a motivation, guilt is more prominent in individualistic 
societies whereas shame is more common in collectivistic societies (ibid.). A 
guilt-motivated individual is likely to confess or reveal their failure because they 
are concerned with making amends (Barrett, 1995, quoted in Velayutham and 
Perera, 2004). Shame on the other hand, is not simply about transgression but 
is associated with a personal shortcoming (Piers and Singer, 1971, quoted in 
Velayutham and Perera, 2004)) which tends to result in a reluctance to provide 
an explanation in order to save face.  
In light of this, Velayutham and Perera (2004, p. 60) argue that ―accountability is 
a cultural practice closely related to the emotional state of guilt‖ and therefore in 
collectivistic societies, accountability may not be an effective way to ensure 
responsible action. More importantly, it is unlikely that a collectivistic society 
would consider accountability desirable if it relies on transparency. 
Another important distinction between collectivistic and individualistic societies 
is the enforcement mechanisms. In a collectivistic society, there is a common 
understanding of what constitutes acceptable behaviour, often based on oral 
tradition or customs (Greif, 1994). Consequently, there is the threat of informal 
collective punishment which is usually sufficient to induce proper behaviour 
(ibid.). This is achieved through the constant sharing of information within the 
group which is a characteristic of collectivistic societies. What Greif (1994) is 
describing is a form of moral accountability.  
In individualistic societies, there is a much lower level of communication which 
hinders the informal social and moral enforcement mechanisms present in 
collectivistic societies. Therefore, formal, often legal, codes and enforcement 
organisations must be developed in order to define acceptable behaviour and to 
enforce it (Chew and Greer, 1997; Greif, 1994). As a result, in this environment 
it is more likely that managerial accountability will be employed in the 
enforcement.  
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This is an important point since most developing countries, which is often where 
humanitarian assistance is required, are collectivistic societies whereas many of 
the NGOs providing the assistance are from individualistic societies (Hailey, 
2001). ―When Western forms of accounting practice are transferred to non-
Western contexts, such as indigenous cultural contexts, they may be 
particularly ineffective, disabling and alienating.‖ (Chew and Greer, 1997, p. 
277). 
In spite of the difficulties in cross-cultural accountability, there is very little 
mention of this in the beneficiary accountability literature. But for NGO‟s 
engaged in relief work, this is a crucial point given the differences in cultural 
backgrounds of not only their staff and beneficiaries but all their stakeholders. 
3.2.3.1.2 Power 
Among the wide range of stakeholders there exist power imbalances, for 
example, between donors and NGOs (Hilhorst, 2002) or between NGOs and 
their beneficiaries (HAP International, 2008). Conflicts of interest between 
stakeholders are usually resolved in favour of the more powerful (Brown, 2007) 
simply because there is no choice. Unless NGOs maintain the trust of their 
supporters and those more powerful than themselves, they may not be able to 
continue (Davis, 2007; Uphoff, 1995; Wenar, 2006; Bendell and Cox, 2006). 
This is one of the greatest structural hindrances to the concept of beneficiary 
accountability (Uphoff, 1995).  
As a result, an NGO is very limited in how responsive they can be towards the 
wishes of their beneficiaries (Davis, 2007) and communities receiving aid are 
well aware that the agenda of NGOs is driven by the donors (Anderson, 2009). 
―These NGOs work on demand, depending on what the current donor agenda 
is.‖ (The Listening Project, 2010b, p. 5).  
Furthermore, some authors argue that since beneficiaries have no power over 
the NGOs (Larose and Adams, 2002; Rubenstein, 2007), the term „beneficiary 
accountability‟ is empty (Brown, 2007). Put another way, if the beneficiaries 
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cannot control, or enforce, the performance of the NGOs, then calling them to 
account is largely meaningless (Day and Klein, 1987). 
3.2.3.1.3 Distance between stakeholders 
The stakeholders who provide the funding and delegate responsibility to the 
NGOs (arguably donors, the public, and philanthropists, for example) are often 
not close to the site of aid delivery and therefore rely on information provided by 
the NGOs. But that information reflects the perceptions of NGO staff which 
could quite possibly distort or even obscure the reality (Hilhorst, 2003; Everett 
and Friesen, 2010). In addition, the information is often not accessible to the 
recipients of the aid (Davis, 2007; Wenar, 2006) and so as Lister (2003, p. 177) 
says, ―...there is an inherent disjuncture between their [NGO‘s] core publics...‖  
Although the judgment of the beneficiaries may differ significantly from that of 
the donors (Charnovitz, 2006), it is those who fund the activities who judge the 
effectiveness of projects in accordance with their interests (Davis, 2007). 
Hence, the link between the funding and the satisfaction of the beneficiaries is 
missing (Larose and Adams, 2002).This is both a reason to institute beneficiary 
accountability as well as a challenge to its implementation. 
In summary, while most of the literature assumes the desirability of 
accountability, the challenges identified by these authors make the 
implementation of beneficiary accountability particularly difficult. As Davis 
(2007, p. 17) puts it: ―Accountability in the kind of incoherent, diverse, violent 
and complex environments in which humanitarian agencies work is an issue of 
dazzling complexity.‖ But these challenges are not often identified, discussed or 
resolved within the beneficiary accountability literature and this may be one 
reason why the gaps exist between the concept and the practice. 
3.2.3.2 Views of the beneficiaries 
In contrast to the views of the academics and humanitarians, the literature is 
quite sparse in representing the views of recipients of aid, especially in relation 
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to accountability of NGOs. There are two notable exceptions: the HAP annual 
reports and The Listening Project. 
Since 2007, HAP has included a section in their annual Humanitarian 
Accountability Report which presents the views of those who received aid within 
that year. Respondents were asked for their views on specific mechanisms of 
accountability rather than the concept itself, which is understandable given the 
complexity. But it is not clear from the feedback whether the respondents 
equated these mechanisms with accountability of the NGO. 
The Listening Project17 was undertaken with the express purpose of capturing 
the opinions of people living in communities that had received international 
assistance (Anderson, 2009). The discussions were open and interviewees 
were asked to give their opinion on aid in general. So again, there were no 
direct links to whether the beneficiaries perceived NGOs to be accountable. 
However both the HAP reports and The Listening Project capture opinions 
which are similar to those quoted in the Rwandan report. 
The HAP reports present opinions in three main areas: 
1. What information was known and how it was received; 
2. How complaints were handled; 
3. How and in what ways community members were able to 
participate. 
In all the reports, the interviewees spoke of the importance of information and 
what they wanted to know. They said that some agencies gave no information 
or gave incomplete or limited information. In South Sudan particularly, this 
created a mistrust of the NGOs (HAP International, 2009). 
Over three HAP reports (2007-9), beneficiaries‟ views were more negative than 
positive in relation to complaints mechanisms. They said that very few 
                                            
17
 For more information on the Listening Project see: 
http://www.cdainc.com/cdawww/project_profile.php?pid=LISTEN&pname=Listening%20Project  
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organisations told them what to do if they had a complaint (HAP International, 
2007). 
In general, interviewees spoke of being involved with, or participating in the 
projects. However the level of participation varied considerably and one 
complaint common in both the 2008 and 2009 HAP reports was that NGOs 
needed to involve the whole of the community rather than just the leaders or a 
few select groups. Another comment was that involvement was usually invited 
at implementation stage but people felt that was too late; that they should be 
consulted before any work started (HAP International, 2009). 
These views show that recipients of aid want the options to give feedback or 
raise concerns, they want to participate in projects and they want to be informed 
about the projects being carried out in their community. But at the same time it 
seems that, in many cases, NGOs are still failing in these three areas. 
The Listening Project heard that the first step to delivering aid should be to build 
relationships and get to know the community (The Listening Project, 2008a). 
Requests for more „face-to-face‟ communication and stronger relationships 
were heard (ibid.). These statements imply that the providers of aid should have 
a greater presence within the community but also that they should have more 
time to develop relationships. Recipients of aid expected these relationships to 
be rooted in trust, caring and respect (The Listening Project, 2010b). 
Like the HAP reports, The Listening Project heard that being unable to raise a 
complaint made people feel powerless (The Listening Project, 2008b). This 
same view was presented in the Rwandan report. 
The Listening Project also heard concerns about the imposition of values which 
were foreign to their culture. These included religious beliefs, democratic ideas, 
human rights and gender equality. As one woman from Ecuador put it, ―the 
community undergoes a strong process of ‗deculturalization‘‖ (The Listening 
Project, 2008b, p. 8). A common sentiment expressed was that aid agencies 
expected their local staff to adapt to their style of communication and how they 
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work. Respondents felt that this hindered participation of the local staff (The 
Listening Project, 2010a). 
Considering the importance of culture as shown by the findings of The Listening 
Project and presented in Section 3.2.3.1.1, the next section digresses briefly to 
draw out some aspects of the Dinka culture. These points provide valuable 
insight into the context for a number of points made in the Findings Chapter. 
3.3 The Dinka 
―...the Dinka is a socially conscious yet individualistic person, gentle and 
humorous, but sensitive, temperamental, and prone to violent reaction when his 
sense of pride and dignity is hurt – and that may not take much.‖ (Deng, 1984, 
p. 6). 
Although Deng (1984) speaks of the Dinka as being individualistic people, it is 
clear that he is not referring to the society as a whole. In that sense, the 
literature indicates that the Dinka are a collectivistic society in which each 
individual interacts most often with members of a specific familial group (Greif, 
1994). In a collectivistic society, ―...[they] depend on a network of highly 
personal relationship.‖ (Hailey, 2001, p. 96). This is confirmed in the Findings 
Chapter. 
Deal (2010) says that an individual‟s identity is submerged within that of the 
group, for example, in instances of justice. He makes the point that 
compensation or vengeance will not be sought from the individual but from the 
group (ibid.) and this is significant. Redress for an injustice perpetrated within 
the tribe will be sought through mediation and compensation whereas if the 
problem is external to the tribe, then the resolution will come through 
vengeance (Mair, 1962) (an example is given in Section 5.3, page 71).  
The chiefs and elders in a Dinka community are responsible for ensuring peace 
and reconciliation and they will seek to do this by persuasion (Deng, 1984). 
Indeed the moral values of the Dinka are based on the principles of peace, unity 
and mutual cooperation (Deng, 1998). A common metaphor used in storytelling 
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to symbolise peace and unity is to speak of the absence of a river running 
between two parties (Deal, 2010) (also mentioned in Section 5.2.2, page 63). 
These values of unity and harmony are expressed in the verb „cieng‟, a Dinka 
word rich with meaning. Among other things, it means „to live together‟ and „to 
look after‟. The noun form means „morals‟, „behaviour‟, „way of life‟ or „culture‟ 
(Deng, 1984). Its importance is emphasised by Deng (1984, p. 13) who 
writes:―Cieng has the sanctity of a moral order not only inherited from the 
ancestors who had in turn received it from God, but also fortified and policed by 
them.‖ This is an example of moral accountability which is common among 
collectivistic societies, as discussed in Section 3.2.3.1.1. 
„Cieng‟ is closely related to dignity („dheeng‟); also a central ideal in Dinka life. It 
is these two values which underpin the social consciousness that Deng speaks 
of. For the Dinka, it is „cieng‟ which makes an individual mindful of the needs of 
others and requires that he give assistance (Deng, 1984). Similarly, the chief is 
someone that an individual looks to for a solution in difficult times (ibid.). In fact 
the Dinka word for „chief‟ can also mean „wealthy‟ or „rich‟ (Deng, 1998) 
something which interviewees mention in Section 5.3.1.1. 
Deal (2010, p. 565) writes that „cieng‟ also expresses the ideal of ―sociocentric 
decisions‖. He explains how his perception of decision making differed from 
those of the Dinka. He equated a proper decision with correct actions whereas 
the Dinka equated a proper decision with the correct process (ibid.). This 
highlights the difference between individualistic and collectivistic thinking and is 
further illustrated in Section 5.3, page 75. 
3.4 Summary 
The complexity of accountability in general and beneficiary accountability in 
particular is demonstrated by the literature reviewed. Across the considerable 
breadth of the subject, there are two notable points. Firstly, accountability is 
seldom defined but is generally agreed to be desirable. Dubnick (1998, p. 68) 
puts it very well: ―We take the need for accountability for granted and assume 
that everyone understands what the concept means and why it is so important.‖ 
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Secondly, the difficulties with implementation, which make this an elusive 
concept, do not appear to detract from the desirability. This is not to say that the 
complexities and challenges are not discussed in the literature. On the contrary, 
but a concept which is widely agreed to be very difficult to put into practice has 
somehow retained its popularity. 
It was difficult to find any gaps in the literature dealing with the general topic of 
accountability. But, perhaps because it is a new subject, there are a number of 
gaps relating to beneficiary accountability: 
1. There is no empirical evidence of which mechanisms work best in 
which contexts and cultures. 
2. Comparisons between beneficiary accountability in humanitarian 
aid and other similar types of accountability in other sectors would 
be useful but none were found. 
3. The articles relating to culture‟s influence on accountability are 
drawn from sectors other than the NGO sector. There was no 
similar research found which had been conducted within the 
context of an international NGO‟s work. 
4. There is little empirical evidence on whether beneficiary 
accountability actually improves the quality of the aid delivered. 
5. There has been no in-depth study into the specific challenges 
faced by NGOs implementing beneficiary accountability. 
This research contributes to point 5: It provides some insight into the reasons 
for the challenges that NGOs face as they attempt to translate the concept of 
accountability to beneficiaries into practice. This literature review is used in the 
Discussion Chapter to augment and interpret the empirical evidence presented 
in the Findings Chapter.  
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4 Methodology 
4.1 Introduction 
This research was undertaken on a part-time basis while I held a full-time 
position within Tearfund‟s programme in South Sudan. Being a staff member 
and combining research and work gave access to interviewees and information 
which would have otherwise been impossible. 
At the start of this research, as a humanitarian professional, I was familiar with 
beneficiary accountability and aware of some of the constraints to 
implementation. The intention was not to question the concept but to gain a 
greater understanding of how to improve its implementation. But as the 
research progressed and more of the literature was reviewed, I began to realise 
the complexity involved in accountability and to question the concept itself. This 
evolution in thinking changed the focus of the research but not the original aim.  
4.2 Methods of research 
Given the highly unpredictable nature of the research environment, flexibility in 
the design approach was required (Robson, 2002). Qualitative methods are the 
best way to capture complexity sufficiently (Rubin and Rubin, 2005) and given 
the context, relief work in a post-conflict, complex emergency, a degree of 
complexity was anticipated.  
There were two research traditions considered as possible options for the 
investigation: case study and grounded theory. These two, which are not 
mutually exclusive, are described by Robson (2002, p. 89) as follows: 
―Case study: Development of detailed, intensive knowledge about a single 
‗case‘, or of a small number of related ‗cases‘.‖ 
―Grounded theory study: The central aim is to generate theory from data 
collected during the study.‖ 
Since the purpose was not to generate theory but to develop knowledge, a case 
study was chosen to achieve the aim. Aspects of an ethnographic approach 
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were used but these were by no means comprehensive (as already discussed 
in Section 1.5). 
One further note is that although this was not intended to be action research, 
one of the natural outcomes was to trigger debate between staff and therefore 
to raise awareness of beneficiary accountability. In this way, it did improve the 
understanding of the concept among staff, an outcome which is consistent with 
action research (Robson, 2002).  
4.2.1 Primary data 
A mixture of semi-structured and unstructured interviews with individuals and 
discussions with focus groups were carried out (see Appendix B). Because of 
my existing knowledge of the subject and context, I was able to select the initial 
informants, some of whom then suggested others. This is known as purposive 
sampling (Bernard, 2002). Aware of my potential to influence the data by my 
selection, I was careful to document and remain aware of bias (ibid.) (see 
Section 4.2.1.3). 
Tearfund staff were selected for interview if they:  
 Were currently or had previously been based at one of the two sites. (In 
spite of this, it was not possible to interview all eligible staff simply 
because of the logistical challenges.) 
 Had the potential to make or impact decisions relating to the sites.  
 Held responsibility at an organisational level which could influence 
accountability measures or promote their understanding.  
Sampling of the two beneficiary communities and their members was more 
complicated. It was important for the credibility of the research to ensure that a 
variety of perspectives was represented (Rubin and Rubin, 2005). To achieve 
this, different categories from within the community were targeted. The different 
categories included: Community leaders, local government authorities, 
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beneficiaries of Tearfund‟s assistance, non-beneficiaries living within the same 
area18 and marginalised members of the community (elderly, widows, disabled 
or chronically ill, those from different tribes). 
As is common with community meetings in South Sudan, though a discussion 
would start with a particular group, passers-by often joined in, altering the 
demographic of the meeting. In addition, meetings were occasionally cancelled 
at the last minute because of a conflicting event in the community, for example, 
voter registration. So in a few cases, the primary determinants of the sampling 
were the community members themselves and my purposive sampling became 
convenience sampling. In spite of this, I was able to gather the data I required. 
 
Figure 2: Focus group discussion with a women's group in Rumwetkor 
Village, Aweil East County 
In most community group meetings, beneficiaries were not separated from non-
beneficiaries. It was important to see whether the community themselves 
offered any distinctions between Tearfund‟s treatment of beneficiaries and non-
beneficiaries. Views of those who were not beneficiaries were solicited in 
individual interviews. 
                                            
18
 In both Aweil East and South, Tearfund’s programmes included primary health care which is available 
to anyone who chooses to use the facilities but in other interventions, such as agricultural training and 
seed provision, beneficiaries are selected based on specific criteria. In these cases, there are non-
beneficiaries within the same community as the beneficiaries. 
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Finally, in order to understand the context and verify findings, three key 
informants were included. Two of these spoke English as a first language and 
had grown up in a Western, individualistic society. Both had lived in Sudan for 
more than 20 years and although neither considered themselves an expert, they 
were able to illustrate points with anecdotes from their experience. The third 
was the Minister for Humanitarian Affairs and Disaster Management for the 
Government of Southern Sudan which was very helpful in providing the official 
view of NGO‟s work in South Sudan. 
4.2.1.1 Interviews 
As shown in Appendix B, a total of 30 interviews and 8 focus group discussions 
were held with approximately 182 people (126 men and 56 women). In addition, 
there were a lot of informal, unrecorded discussions with Tearfund staff which 
proved a good method of verification and triangulation. 
At the beginning of the research, the interviews were quite flexible to allow for 
ideas to be presented. An initial set of questions was drafted and tested in the 
beginning of 2010.Toward the end, the themes that had emerged were followed 
up in more depth by adding new questions or conducting follow up interviews. 
This proved to be a good way to achieve in-depth understanding and to fill in 
gaps (Rubin and Rubin, 2005). The final set of questions is included in 
Appendix A. 
Interviews are particularly difficult when the concept under discussion is so 
complex, as in the case of accountability. In giving explanations, it is easy to 
ask leading questions as was the case with some of the initial interviews. This 
improved as the research progressed. One reason for the improvement was 
that most of the interviews were recorded on a digital recorder, with the 
interviewee‟s permission, and then transcribed using voice recognition software. 
This facilitated an iterative process of self-criticism and learning.  
Both the audio and written transcripts were stored electronically as an audit trail. 
Transcripts were sent to the interviewees for their comments and corrections. 
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The emails confirming the accuracy of the transcript and the interviewee‟s 
preferences regarding confidentiality were stored. 
Throughout this document, references to interviews are shown in brackets after 
the quotation. The first number refers to the interviewee number shown in 
Appendix B and the second to the line in the transcript, for example, (1:1). In 
some cases, only the interviewee number is given. When a direct quotation is 
used, it is enclosed in quotation marks and is in italics. In instances where text 
is added to clarify the quotation, this is enclosed in square brackets. 
Site Date Period Activities 
Aweil 
South 
09/10/2009 5 days Semi-structured interview with accountability 
officer; Informal discussion with area 
coordinator; Observation; Informal discussion 
with accountability extension worker at Nyeth 
Primary Health Care Unit (PHCU) 
Aweil 
East 
16/11/2009 5 days Observation 
Aweil 
East 
22/03/2010 10 
days 
Informal discussion with staff; focus group 
discussion with farmers‟ group; semi-structured 
interviews with staff 
Aweil 
South 
10/05/2010 2 days Focus group discussions; semi-structured 
interviews with staff and community leaders 
Aweil 
East 
12/05/2010 2 days Focus group discussions 
Aweil 
East 
01/12/2010 5 days Focus group discussions; semi-structured 
interviews with staff and community leaders; 
meetings with new accountability officer and 
extension workers 
Table 1: Visits to field sites 
The collection of primary data took place between August 2009 and December 
2010. Travel to the field sites from Juba was costly (USD 200 per one way 
flight) and required a significant amount of logistical support. This meant that 
the number of visits undertaken was limited and, since they were combined with 
work activities, it was difficult to control the research schedule (see Table 1.) 
Apart from giving access to field staff, field visits proved particularly useful as a 
method of verifying the information given in interviews through observation 
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(Robson, 2002). Photographs and notes were the primary methods of capturing 
data from first-hand observations.  
During the research period there were two significant events in South Sudan 
which had an impact on Tearfund‟s operations: The elections in April 2010 and 
the referendum on secession in 2011 (see Section 2.1.1). As a precautionary 
security measure, only staff local to the area remained in the field sites during 
the elections in April 2010. The positive impact for the research was that the 
expatriate staff were relocated to Juba during this time which made them 
accessible for interviews and informal discussions. The negative impact was 
that a visit to conduct research in May was carried out in an environment where 
political tensions were still evident. This made it difficult to ask questions 
relating to accountability since they were viewed through a political lens and 
raised concern.  
Although the primary data had been gathered before the voting began for the 
referendum in January 2011, the preceding three months included nationwide 
preparatory activities such as voter education and registration, which meant 
some Sudanese staff members were not available for interviews and not all 
meetings with community members could be arranged. A timeline (see Figure 
3) shows the research visits and main events which had an impact on the 
research. 
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Figure 3: Timeline of major events occurring during the research period 
 
Aweil South
Visits to sites
Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec
2009 2010
Elections Referendum
Aweil East
Programme
Community 
Empowerment 
and 
Accountability 
Officer leaves 
project
Area 
Coordinator 
leaves the 
project
Funding for 
health project 
ends
Project closed
New Area 
Coordinator 
joins the 
project
Community 
Empowerment 
and 
Accountability 
Officer is 
appointed
Programme wide strategic 
review
New Programme Director  
(PD) appointed
Programme Director 
leaves programme -
Acting PD appointed
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4.2.1.2 Ethical considerations 
In conducting the research, it was necessary to balance the interests of the 
community, of Tearfund‟s project and staff, and the demands of the research 
schedule (May, 1993). Wherever possible, interviews were combined with other 
activities so as to reduce the time and travel for interviewees and staff. Extra 
time was always built in to allow sufficient time for community members to 
express views or ask questions that may not have been specific to the subject. 
Most of the interviews with members of the community were not recorded 
because meetings were held outside. Instead, notes were taken and typed up 
as soon as possible. Any direct quotations were written verbatim during the 
interview. 
The following steps were taken to protect the interviewees: 
 Every interview began with an explanation of the nature and purpose of 
the research and an assurance of the confidentiality of participants if they 
wished to remain anonymous. 
 A recorder was only used if permission was given and then the 
interviewee received a copy of the transcript to review. 
 Permission to attribute quotations was sought and granted in writing in 
most cases, and occasionally verbally. 
 Each interviewee gave their preference as to how they wanted to be 
identified. 
 Photographs for use in this thesis were only taken if permission was 
granted first. 
In order to reduce the environmental impact of the research, literature was 
stored and reviewed electronically whenever possible. This had the advantage 
of making the information more easily transportable while reducing the amount 
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of paper used. Combining research and work-related visits reduced the number 
of flights and car journeys.  
4.2.1.3 Bias 
Various factors could have affected the data collection and interpretation. These 
were taken into consideration as shown in Table 2. 
Characteristic 
of author 
Positive impact Negative impact 
Tearfund 
employee 
This was a definite benefit 
to the research. Tearfund is 
a trusted organisation in the 
area and as a result, access 
to local authorities and 
community members was 
willingly granted. A certain 
amount of trust was 
conferred. 
 
Knowledge of the wider 
organisation including 
culture, values and internal 
decision processes helped 
in understanding 
background factors. It also 
gave access to internal 
documentation. 
There was evidence that both 
communities were reluctant 
to give negative views 
because of their relationship 
with Tearfund (see Section 
5.2.2, page 64). In one site, 
this was overcome to a 
degree through reassurance. 
In the other site, the only way 
was to ask direct, closed 
questions which limited the 
research. However, in itself 
this reluctance was an 
important finding. 
  
To minimise subjective 
interpretation, I tested 
findings and thinking with 
peers. 
Knowledge of 
staff 
Staff were at ease more 
quickly and often 
volunteered information 
informally, outside of 
planned interviews. 
 
Note: Of the staff 
interviewed, only three were 
known to me prior to moving 
to South Sudan.  
 
Possibility of influencing the 
interviewees through leading 
questions. This was 
exacerbated by the tendency 
for the interviews to turn into 
discussions with the 
interviewees asking 
questions relating to the 
learning. In review, 
responses to leading 
questions were only included 
if corroborated from other 
sources. 
 
Potential for staff to view 
questions as a test and be 
fearful of giving incorrect or 
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controversial information. 
Measures were taken to 
minimise this by explaining 
that the information would 
only be used for this 
research. There was no 
evidence of concern from 
staff. 
 
As above, subjectivity was 
minimised through 
discussions with peers and 
colleagues. 
White 
Zimbabwean 
Some community members 
were willing to meet with a 
foreigner simply out of 
cultural courtesy. As one 
community leader put it, 
―How can you be white if 
you are from Africa?‖ (29) 
Being viewed as a foreigner 
meant some inherent mistrust 
(according to Sudanese staff 
themselves) and a resulting 
tendency to temper 
responses. This was evident 
at times.  
 
There was no way to 
minimise this effect during the 
short visits to the field sites. 
Female This was an advantage 
when trying to reach the 
more marginalised within 
the community which 
included women. 
The community elders and 
leaders did not show any 
reluctance to meet or to 
discuss issues of leadership 
and accountability with a 
woman. However, it would be 
impossible to ascertain the 
degree to which responses 
may have been different had 
the researcher been male. 
No previous 
experience of 
South Sudan 
This meant a fresh 
perspective and a tendency 
to ask why things happened 
in a certain way. 
There may have been 
nuances and meanings that 
were not picked up in 
interviews.  
Table 2: Factors considered in relation to the author's bias 
4.2.1.4 Translation 
All the interviews conducted with the community members were done with the 
help of translators. In Aweil East, this was always the same person – a 
Tearfund staff member who was also a pastor of a Christian church within the 
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community. In Aweil South, this was always a member of staff, but not always 
the same person. All the translators were male. 
Between the translators, there was a big difference in their understanding of the 
topic. The translator in Aweil East had been responsible for beneficiary 
accountability as part of his role, thus he already understood the concept. In 
addition, he had extensive experience in translating often helping me to 
interpret answers by explaining the context. He also played a significant role 
within the community: According to the chief, he was the representative or 
mediator (28:21) between Tearfund and the community. Given this position, it 
would be naive to expect objectivity from him but all data were triangulated. 
In Aweil South, the translators could understand the concept of accountability in 
a pre-interview explanation, but could not translate it. This became clear as 
answers didn‟t always correspond to the questions. This was verified by 
checking recordings with a second translator. The result was that some of the 
information was not useful. Prior familiarity with the concept was thus crucial in 
translating what it meant.  
4.3 Analysis of data 
The software Atlas.ti was used to store data and to identify themes that 
emerged across the different interviews. This was done by creating and 
allocating codes and memos to the text. It also allowed for a diagrammatic 
representation of the different themes that had been identified by the coding 
(see Appendix C for an example). This helped with visualising the 
interconnections between different points. 
However, a reliance on software like this, especially when research is 
undertaken over a long period of time, can obscure newly-emerging themes. 
Therefore, the interview transcripts were reviewed at three different stages: 
1. After an interview, when the transcription was complete; 
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2. In September 2010 all the data collected up to that point were 
reviewed in order to identify gaps and areas for follow-up 
questioning; 
3. After completion of the data-gathering, all transcripts were 
reviewed once again.  
4.4 Summary 
Because of the complex nature of the subject and context, qualitative 
methodology was used to conduct this research. A number of external factors 
such as the unpredictability of the environment, the logistics required to conduct 
field visits and the part-time nature of the research increased the amount of 
flexibility required and made it difficult to control the planned schedule. This was 
contrasted with the willing support of the Tearfund staff and the members of the 
Dinka communities which ensured that required information was collected even 
within the constraints. In spite of the challenges with translation, local staff were 
willing to spend time helping to interpret not only the words, but meanings within 
the specific context. This proved invaluable. 
One of the greatest challenges encountered was the Dinka communities‟ 
reluctance to give honest, negative examples in response to certain questions. 
But this in itself became one of the findings of the research. Similarly, the 
challenges of translating the English word „accountability‟ also underlined one of 
the main points of the thesis. 
The next chapter presents the primary data gathered using the methods 
explained in this chapter. 
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5 Findings 
This chapter presents the primary data gathered between August 2009 and 
December 2010 in three sections: 
The first section documents the practical implementation of beneficiary 
accountability in Tearfund‟s South Sudan programme. This shows what 
methods were used and what factors influenced the implementation. 
The second section outlines the complexity of and challenges to this 
implementation as expressed by Tearfund staff, other agency staff and key 
informants. This section has a number of parallels to the Literature review 
chapter. 
The third section presents the views of the members of the two communities in 
which the research was conducted. The focus is on the communities‟ 
perceptions of the NGO and the beneficiary accountability mechanisms used. 
5.1 Tearfund’s implementation of beneficiary accountability 
Tearfund‟s decision to sign up to HAP was made quite quickly and easily 
because they were already concerned by the problems with humanitarian 
accountability and the principles of HAP made good sense (6:4). 
Implementation began in 2005 and at that time, it primarily involved raising 
awareness of the concept among field staff using a self-assessment checklist 
(10:18). But the real roll out took place in 2007 using a Good Practice Guide19 
Tearfund had developed based on the HAP benchmarks. A chronological 
outline of the developments which took place at Tearfund‟s head office in the 
UK is shown in Table 3. These had a direct impact on the different DMT 
programmes who were implementing beneficiary accountability mechanisms. 
  
                                            
19
 Tearfund’s Disaster Management Team Good Practice Guidelines: Beneficiary Accountability, 2
nd
 
Edition, February 2008 
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2005 Self-assessment checklist sent out to DMT field staff. 
2005/6 Beneficiary accountability mechanisms piloted in the Pakistan 
programme; case study produced by Tearfund. 
2006/7 Beneficiary accountability mechanisms piloted in the North Kenya 
programme; HAP visitors to the project compile case studies. 
2007 „Good Practice Guidelines: Beneficiary Accountability‟ developed 
and introduced to senior DMT staff. 
2008 Development of Tearfund‟s Quality Standards for Emergency 
Response. This was a consolidation of the different standards 
and codes to which Tearfund was a signatory. At the time of this 
research, it was the only document where all the accountability 
stakeholders were identified20. 
2008 Tearfund achieved HAP certification after a successful audit. This 
generated an action plan (known as the HAP action plan) which 
was reviewed biannually. 
2009 Development of Tearfund‟s Quality Standards Field Guide to 
replace the various Good Practice Guideline documents. (See 
Appendix D for the 6 practical steps to implementing beneficiary 
accountability.) 
2009 Tearfund develops a corporate action plan for the implementation 
of accountability to those the organisation aims to assist. 
Table 3: Tearfund's implementation of beneficiary accountability 
In the South Sudan Programme, assistance with the roll out was provided by 
the officer who had worked in Tearfund‟s North Kenya programme. Over 
approximately six months of 2007, he carried out training for the staff and 
helped with starting up beneficiary accountability in the four field sites. Similar to 
other DMT programmes, he put an emphasis on information sharing, 
beneficiary participation and complaints mechanisms – HAP benchmarks 3, 4 
and 521. The focus on these benchmarks was a result of instructions received 
from head office (10:33). 
To fulfil benchmark 3, notice boards were put up within the areas of work. The 
aim was to publicise information about Tearfund and the specific projects 
thereby ensuring transparency. The decision to use notice boards came from 
the accountability officer and the programme director (PD) (5:42). However 
there was little buy-in to the idea from the area coordinators (ACs) at the time 
                                            
20
 See http://www.tearfund.org/en/about_us/how_we_work/tearfund_quality_standards/  
21
 There was a change in the order of the HAP benchmarks between the 2007 and the 2010 standards 
but for consistency, the thesis refers to the 2010 standard as shown in section 2.3.2.1. 
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(1:23, 5:42) and as a result, the boards were not really used (see Sections 5.1.1 
and 5.1.2).  
For benchmark 4, there was little for the accountability officer to introduce since 
staff were already encouraging the community to participate in the projects. 
Speaking about Aweil South, one interviewee said, ―The concept of participation 
was not new to this community. Tearfund has been including the community 
from the beginning.‖ (1:19) - also confirmed by (2:45, 5:72, 9:17, 27:22). 
For benchmark 5, the suggested methodology was to use complaints boxes. 
According to the Aweil South accountability officer, these were never put in 
place (1:26). At the time of the research, other mechanisms were used to 
capture and deal with complaints (for example, see Section 5.1.2). 
―At the beginning it was all about complaints mechanisms and notice boards - 
that was the kind of perception coming from the UK ... that's what you had to 
do.‖ (10:41). This statement raises an important point: Two very simple 
mechanisms were given an emphasis and this was still evident in the 
programme during the research period. Possible reasons for this focus are 
discussed in Section 6.2. 
 The training given by the accountability officer in the initial stages used material 
which had been developed at head office. But, as one interviewee put it, ―...the 
trainings ...tended to be incredibly theoretical and not practical. Not ...this is 
what we mean when we're talking about beneficiary accountability.‘‖ (5:46). 
Total staff interviewed 23 
Training part of induction 8 
Attended a training course 14 
No training or induction 5 
 Table 4: Breakdown of training received by interviewees (Tearfund staff) 
Out of the 23 staff interviewees based in South Sudan, 5 had received no 
training on beneficiary accountability (see Table 4). Others received training as 
part of their induction or as a standalone course and in a few cases, both. 
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During the research period, there was one Tearfund-run training course which 
included beneficiary accountability. This was attended by 8 staff, mostly 
expatriates. Other than that, training was provided during induction or by the 
accountability officers. 
 ―Without ongoing training and full induction, staff view this as negative criticism 
and their attitude towards the process is negative.‖ (1:28). This sentiment was 
supported by a respondent from another NGO who said, ―...you can sort of look 
for the silver bullet which will make everybody understand ... It hasn't worked 
like that for me and has been a matter of communicating again and again and 
again the understanding of this.‖ (37:15)  
Another component of beneficiary accountability is to ensure that staff are 
competently trained to do their job (HAP benchmark 2). This type of training 
was far more frequent and was provided through a variety of means. Similar to 
participation, this was not 
something which Tearfund 
started as a result of their HAP 
membership – it was already 
standard practice. 
5.1.1 Implementation in 
Aweil East 
During the first visit to Aweil East 
in November 2009, the project 
site had one staff member who 
was responsible for beneficiary 
accountability, a local staff 
member. The accountability 
mechanisms implemented were 
informal. Information from 
Tearfund was disseminated via 
Figure 4: Notice board outside the Aweil 
East compound, November 2009 
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community meetings and through local leaders. Feedback or queries from the 
community were presented in person, usually by the leaders (4:48). There was 
no use of the notice board which had originally been erected as was evidenced 
by its state of disrepair (see Figure 4).  
In spite of the lack of formal mechanisms, the community seemed happy with 
the methods of communication at this stage. This was according to interviews 
conducted during the first two visits to Aweil East.  
In December 2009, a new AC was appointed. He had worked for Tearfund 
before, although not in South Sudan, and was strongly in favour of beneficiary 
accountability. As a result, he made the decision to recruit an accountability 
officer and three extension workers. The officer level position was more senior 
than that of the supervisor who had previously been solely responsible for 
beneficiary accountability. The new structure meant that the extension workers 
reported to the supervisor who reported to 
the officer. The officer appointed was a 
Sudanese man but not from the Dinka 
tribe. The supervisor and extension 
workers were all Dinka Malual men from 
the area.  
Following the appointment of the 
accountability officer, there was a change 
reported (12:107) and observed (visit to 
Aweil East December 2010) in the level of 
awareness among the team as well as in 
the formal mechanisms being put in place. 
For example, the notice board outside the 
gate of the main compound had been 
repaired and contained information about 
the staff and project (see Figure 5). In addition, site specific information had 
been painted on boards which were to be put up in the different areas. The 
information, however, was all in English. 
Figure 5: Notice board outside 
the Aweil East compound in 
December 2010 
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Several community groups had been formed to act as conduits of information 
both from and to Tearfund. Although developed just prior to the end of the 
research period, the communities‟ initial response to this idea was positive. 
5.1.2 Implementation in Aweil South 
Up until November 2009, this site had an expatriate officer who was responsible 
for ensuring accountability to beneficiaries. Reporting to her were seven local 
staff, male extension workers (all from the Dinka Malual tribe); one based in 
each payam where Tearfund ran clinics (PHCU/Cs). 
She had implemented formal mechanisms, for example, each extension worker 
had a book in which to log complaints or queries. On a weekly basis these were 
brought to the office for a 
response from the relevant staff 
member (depending on the nature 
of the query) (1:26). There was a 
set time frame within which a 
response would be given. 
At the time of the first visit to Aweil 
South, there were two notice 
boards in the programme: one 
outside the main compound and 
one outside one of the clinics. 
Neither had information about the 
project on them (see Figure 6) but 
from interviews it was evident that 
the boards had been used at one 
time and that information had 
been posted in the Dinka 
language (30:11) (see Section 5.3, page 68). In May 2010, however, the board 
outside the compound was only being used to advertise Tearfund vacancies.  
Figure 6: Notice board outside the Aweil 
South compound, October 2009 
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As the Accountability Officer explained, unlike the boards used in North Kenya, 
there were no glass doors to protect the information from either the weather or 
from being removed by passers-by (1:23, 5:42, 14:87). She said that the lack of 
commitment from the AC (in position before the research commenced) had 
resulted in funds not being released for the glass (1:23).  
The greatest impact seems to have come from her relationship with the 
community (2:18). The community members would come with the extension 
workers to present their feedback in person and the Accountability Officer would 
then hold discussions with the community in response (ibid.). The community 
gave her the title of „Mama‟, a term of respect. A direct outcome of this 
relationship was feedback from church leaders which resulted in a significant 
change to Tearfund‟s nutrition programme. The change was positive both for 
the beneficiaries and for Tearfund (1, 5).  
As mentioned in the Context chapter (see Section 2.2.1.2), from February 2010, 
there were no longer dedicated staff responsible for implementing beneficiary 
accountability in Aweil South. During the interviews, when asked who had taken 
over, one of their colleagues replied, ―I think at the moment it is no-one...‖ 
(14:31). In spite of this, during the period between February and December 
2010, when the project closed, staff continued to make information available to 
the community, invited participation and responded to queries or complaints. 
The difference was that the mechanisms became less formal. 
5.1.3 Programme wide factors 
There were a number of factors identified at a programmatic level which 
affected the implementation at field level. Firstly, the senior management, 
specifically the PD, had a significant influence. In December 2009, a new PD 
joined Tearfund‟s South Sudan Programme and having worked for Tearfund in 
two other DMT programmes, she had considerable experience of the internal 
systems and standards. She emphasised the implementation of quality 
standards, including beneficiary accountability, more than her predecessors had 
done and this made a visible difference in the project sites. For example, the AC 
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at Aweil East began to conduct regular training for his staff which included 
modules on beneficiary accountability. 
Secondly, at a strategic review in July 2010 the senior management team made 
a decision to place greater emphasis on beneficiary accountability in the 
programme. This influenced implementation simply by raising the profile and 
awareness among the staff.  
Similarly, DMT programmes were required by Tearfund‟s head office to report 
against the HAP action plan biannually, the corporate action plan on a quarterly 
basis, and to report on any community feedback received on a monthly basis. 
These requirements acted as reminders to staff and so were also influencing 
factors. 
The steps taken to implement beneficiary accountability correlated closely to the 
HAP standards. The accountability mechanisms employed were quite simple 
and in some cases, seemed to have been used for no specific reason other 
than they had worked in another programme. The simplicity of the mechanisms 
contrasted with the complexity revealed by interviewees‟ definitions and 
understanding of the concept. 
5.2 Complexity and challenges 
5.2.1 Complexity 
As a comparison to the Literature review, interviewees were asked to give their 
understanding of the concept of „accountability‟. At a senior management team 
meeting held in Juba in October 2010, attending staff22 were asked to define 
accountability in short phrases or sentences. Most identified the aspect of 
answerability in their definitions; only one identified enforceability. Three 
examples are given (17): 
                                            
22
 At the time the senior management team had 11 members with 9 different nationalities. English was 
the first language for 6 of the 11. 
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―Being held responsible for actions, and their outcomes/ impact, by others who 
are affected by these actions or have a right to influence them.‖  
―Being responsible to another person for the impact of your words, action, 
attitudes and behaviour, and responding to feedback from that person when it is 
given.‖ 
―Making someone do what they said they would do – consequences if not.‖ 
Staff were also asked to represent their own accountability within their role in 
Tearfund by drawing accountability webs which ―...reflect parties‘ perceptions of 
who is accountable to whom in an organization.‖ (Gelfand et al., 2004, p. 143). 
The arrows in the diagrams represent the direction of accountability. A selection 
of these are shown in Figure 7 - Figure 12, the captions include the role of each 
person.  
The webs show the different personal interpretations of accountability, 
highlighting the subjectivity of the concept. Some webs are more complicated 
and show more awareness of indirect accountability (e.g. Tearfund‟s 
accountability which indirectly becomes the individual‟s accountability). Some 
show interrelated accountability (e.g. where different stakeholders are in turn 
accountable to each other). The main point is the vast difference with which 
each individual perceives their own accountability.  
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Figure 7: Accountability web - Area Coordinator 
 
 
Figure 8: Accountability web - Technical Logistics Manager 
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Figure 9: Accountability web - Area Coordinator (Aweil East) 
 
Figure 10: Accountability web - Programme Director 
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Figure 12: Accountability web - Deputy Programme Director 
Figure 11: Accountability web - Food Security Project 
Officer (Aweil South) 
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When speaking specifically about beneficiary accountability, there were different 
levels of understanding among Tearfund staff. Firstly, there were a number of 
different terms used for „beneficiary accountability‟ (also discussed in Section 
3.2.3). For example: 
―I always want to call it ‗humanitarian accountability‘‖ (5:46). 
 ―I don't like the term ‗downward accountability‘, I don't like the term ‗beneficiary 
accountability‘ ... I prefer just to talk about accountability to the people we work 
with.‖ (10:10).  
One staff member consistently referred to „community accountability‟ (2) but the 
majority used the term „beneficiary accountability‟. This was most common 
simply because it was the most readily understood. As the International Director 
said, ―...for me ‗beneficiary‘ is an unhelpful term and it's got connotations but in 
my view it is better than ‗downward‘‖ (6:18). 
Similar to Tearfund, one of the other three NGOs included in the research also 
used the term beneficiary accountability (37:11). Another used „humanitarian 
accountability‟ specifically in order to convey their accountability to other 
stakeholders such as non-beneficiary community members and local authorities 
(38). The third didn‟t have a specific term (36). 
Apart from the difference of opinion on terminology, different levels of 
comprehension were also evident. The examples which follow start with those 
that were least clear on the meaning of „beneficiary accountability‟. 
―...what we did for the community or what we are doing to the community, the 
results ... of it, what comes out of what we have done for them.‖ (11:7). 
 ―...we have the ... [accountability officer] who is in charge of beneficiary 
accountability, following up what the beneficiaries need, what they have done...‖ 
(14:18). 
These two explanations were given by Sudanese staff. Their definitions showed 
that they understood it had something to do with the services provided to the 
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community but were either unclear on the exact meaning or were unable to 
articulate the meaning.  
A group discussion with the project manager and several of the project officers 
in Aweil East captured the concept more accurately. This group was mostly 
Sudanese but there were also two expatriates: 
 It is how the beneficiaries relate to us in the programme - it should be a 
two-way relationship. 
 It includes the feedback that beneficiaries give to us. 
 Their [beneficiaries] participation in the programme. 
 Transparency - we share who we are and what our intentions are in a 
transparent way with the community.  
 Recognition that the project is theirs, it‟s for them and about them. 
 We are accountable in the end for what we do and whether we do what 
we said we would. (15:11) 
More senior staff in Tearfund and other agencies, most of whom were 
expatriates, offered the following explanations: 
―...if you have a group of [community] leaders who are willing to come to you 
and tell you that your programming is wrong, that's what we're talking about.‖ 
(5:68) 
―...it's just cultivating that attitude: one of openness and transparency, of 
respect, of humility that would really be an indicator as to whether you're being 
accountable or not. And that is something which is subjective and can't be 
measured by a standard.‖ (37:23). This quotation presents a crucial point which 
is also illustrated by the accountability webs: the abstract and subjective nature 
of accountability. As this interviewee points out, it is difficult to measure. 
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One interviewee put it like this, ―...the problem with it is it's a dynamic and not a 
project...‖ (5:38). This was echoed by others (6, 10) but the reality was that 
some interviewees did perceive beneficiary accountability to be a project. For 
example, the AC for Aweil South said that when new staff arrived, they heard 
that there was another sector or project called „accountability‟ being 
implemented alongside the other sectors such as health care and agriculture 
(2:24). As a member of another agency put it, ―People look at the standard and 
say, ‗If I tick the box here, here and here, then we must be accountable to 
beneficiaries,‘ which isn't actually true. It's trying to communicate much more 
than the standards, it's about the essence of what is behind it‖ (37:15). 
Apart from the different definitions given, translating accountability proved very 
difficult when talking to non-English speakers. A number of interviewees noted 
this: ―...sometimes the literal translation of accountability in a different language 
makes this very difficult.‖ (12:111). 
―...I think in this context, translation is... I mean there are so many problems with 
it; incredibly difficult.‖ (36:27).  
To get around this problem, some interviewees said they used illustrations in 
discussions. For example, the Accountability Officer in Aweil South would ask 
the community to think of those who held power over them and how they would 
want that power to be used (1:15). 
Consistent with the literature, the definitions of „accountability‟ varied 
considerably. While senior staff, most of whom were expatriates, tended to have 
a fairly comprehensive understanding, they were also more likely to discuss its 
desirability than the complexity of its meaning. In contrast, the more junior staff, 
typically recruited locally, did not fully understand it. The complexity of 
„accountability‟ was compounded by the problems with translation. These 
varying levels of comprehension among staff were evident both in relation to 
„accountability‟ and to the specifics of „beneficiary accountability‟ which led to 
some of the challenges to implementation. 
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5.2.2 Challenges 
5.2.2.1 Complexity and context 
The complexity of the term and the resulting misconceptions had negative 
consequences for the implementation of beneficiary accountability. For 
example, the Accountability Officer in Aweil East said that his colleagues 
viewed his position as a form of policing mechanism: He was viewed with 
suspicion and given no support (16:3). This was echoed by one of the project 
managers who had been present at the time of the initial training in 2007. She 
said that at the time, the team had asked the Accountability Officer, ―Okay, so 
now you are going to be the policeman?‖ (3:5). Another interviewee said, 
―...instead of understanding the role of community accountability officers ... they 
just assumed that they are working a sort of security thing for the organisation... 
so that was really de-motivating.‖ (2:10).  
In general, junior staff felt that beneficiary accountability mechanisms were 
aimed at monitoring their performance. This correlates with the point made in 
Section 3.2.1.3, that the process of requiring accountability essentially indicates 
a lack of trust. This feeling seemed to be reinforced by allocating responsibility 
to one person: ―Accountability needs someone to get it going but if that person 
stays too long, it begins to feel like policing.‖ (9:5) 
In Tearfund, responsibility for implementation at each field site sat with the AC 
(6:23, 9:10) but was usually delegated, for example, to the accountability 
officers. However, as Tearfund‟s field guide says, ―it is... important that 
accountability is understood to be everyone‘s responsibility; each team member 
has a part to play.‖23 While making it everyone‟s responsibility may have 
reduced the feeling that it was a policing mechanism, this also had problems: 
―The problem was I think Tearfund knew that everyone was supposed to be 
responsible for it so no one was.‖ (5:76). Staff want to know exactly what is 
required from them as individuals when they are told it is everyone‟s 
                                            
23
 Tearfund’s Quality Standards Field Guide (Standard 3:Accountability), First Edition, December 2009  
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responsibility. As one interviewee said, ―...it does sometimes scare people into 
thinking it's another responsibility, something else I have to do.‖ (37:11). 
One reason is the time constraints of a relief environment: ―...it was just another 
thing... our programme was struggling to actually run a health care clinic much 
less sit down with the community and be accountable to them.‖ (5:50). In this 
context, most staff have to work extra hours to meet their deadlines and so they 
become very task-oriented. ―..you know many times it is very tempting to just 
...start giving out your services and you want to catch up with time...‖ (11:24). 
However, in spite of her statement, this interviewee went on to describe the 
benefit of making the time to sit down and chat with the beneficiaries. She and a 
number of her colleagues noted the importance of building relationships even 
though it was time consuming. “If you have good community relationships, you 
are already accountable to your community.‖ (10:42).  
5.2.2.2 Relationship and trust 
The staff in Aweil East also spoke of relationships; they felt that their individual 
conduct towards the community was very important (15:29). This was further 
supported by the community leaders when discussing the change of ACs in 
December 2009 (see Section 5.1.1). The former AC had held the position for 
three years and had developed a good rapport with the community. When he 
left, the leaders said that Tearfund had ―crossed the river and left them behind‖ 
(16:4) which, as explained in Section 3.3, is a euphemism for division, a lack of 
harmony in a community. This loss of a single individual was significant to the 
community because he was someone with whom they had developed a good 
relationship, they trusted him. As one interviewee put it, ―...accountability is 
highly correlated with trust and trust is extremely difficult to build with an 
institution. It's about individuals...‖ (36:41). 
As discussed in Section 5.1.2, another example was the accountability officer in 
Aweil South who developed a good relationship with the community. ―...this 
quality of relationship with the people that we‘re working with is a major factor in 
determining whether we have success or not.‖ (37:27) 
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Relationships with the community were adversely affected by the high staff 
turnover as noted by a number of interviewees: ―...in terms of accountability... 
with a (sic) staff turnover, it is very difficult in the set up.‖ (12:107). In South 
Sudan, this became more evident because projects frequently continued in one 
area for years at a time (as explained in Section 2.1.2). This mean that 
communities, who were mostly static, were constantly being introduced to new 
people: ―We've got people coming on one-year contracts, two-year contracts... 
the institutional memory is non-existent and the Sudanese are here, they are 
here forever, they've got institutional memory.‖ (21:50). This made it difficult to 
develop trust between the NGO and the community (36:41). 
5.2.2.3 Culture’s influence 
Possibly one of the greatest constraints identified by the research was the 
reluctance of community members to provide the NGO with negative feedback. 
One of the staff based in Aweil East, herself Sudanese, explained this in light of 
Sudanese culture: ―...there is a cultural aspect of when foreigners generally 
come to your community and if they have come with a good intention, you 
welcome them. And [you] just say ‗yes‘ because [you] know [they] have come 
with a positive thing that will leave a positive impact on [your] lives.‖ (13:119). 
This was echoed by one of the key informants who, when talking about my 
research, said, ―How open they'll be with you, I don't know because another 
issue between the NGOs and the Sudanese community is trust and it's tied in 
with a whole lot of things like Sudanese hospitality, and they don't want to say 
anything bad to a guest.‖ (21:32). 
Similarly, NGO staff felt that the reluctance to give negative feedback was 
related to a reluctance to upset a potential donor. A key informant put it this 
way, ―...they're not going to upset the donor because you are the donor and if 
they say the wrong thing to you, maybe money won't come.‖ (21:35) 
 ―Because I am vulnerable, I am in need it silences me from asking so many 
questions... So because they have nothing, they will go with whatever is offered. 
This is where the problem is.‖ (20:20) 
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The Food Security Project Officer in Aweil South gave an example of how 
farmers would not tell the truth about what they had harvested: ―When you 
come to the farmers and you ask them, ‗What have you harvested?‘ They say, 
‗Nothing! The floods have destroyed, or the drought has destroyed [everything]; 
nothing I have harvested!‘" (14:19). However, it‟s easy to understand why a 
farmer would be reluctant to tell an NGO that the harvest was good if that same 
NGO is distributing seed and tools to farmers in need.  
But although this is understandable, the NGOs need honest feedback if they are 
going to run effective, responsive projects (10:42).  ―I‘m sure, I mean I know, 
that there are things that are wrong with these programmes but these are not 
things that communities feel comfortable as individuals, as a group, bringing to 
you. So in that sense ... it's [beneficiary accountability] a very challenging thing 
to implement effectively and to get the most out of.‖ (36:7).  
―...it's a real problem that people don't want to offend you and therefore have 
real difficulties in raising issues that would otherwise bring you to account.‖ 
(37:36) 
This issue was observed during the interviews with community members. In one 
particular group (27), a criticism of Tearfund was mentioned in passing. Later in 
the conversation, when discussing how problems would be handled, the group 
said, ―We have never had any problems with Tearfund here‖ (27:27). Referring 
to the earlier point of criticism, I asked whether they would not consider that as 
a problem. The group were instantly visibly uncomfortable and chastised the 
man who had raised the criticism. It was only after much reassurance from the 
translator that they were prepared to talk about the way in which it was handled. 
But the group continued to insist that this was not really a problem (27). 
Similarly, two other groups also said that there had ―never been any problems‖ 
(28, 30).  
While hesitation to criticise an NGO was obviously a factor, criticising anyone 
openly went against the Sudanese culture. For example, in Aweil South, the 
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health committee24 reported that the drugs which should have been dispensed 
in Tearfund‟s clinic were being sold in the market. This would have forced 
people to purchase drugs which they should have been able to access free of 
charge. As this affected the whole community, the Accountability Officer 
suggested calling a community meeting to raise the issue. However, when it 
came time for the committee to explain what they had witnessed, no-one was 
prepared to speak (1:42). Similarly, in other instances, although they were 
aware of a problem, they refused to report it (ibid.). This was confirmed by one 
of the key informants, “You'll find that at many Sudanese meetings, they won't 
criticise somebody to their face, it's very important that everybody saves face.‖ 
(21:33). 
5.2.2.4 Power dynamics and responsiveness 
The difficulty of soliciting honest, negative feedback from the community was 
further complicated by the NGO‟s limited ability to respond to feedback. ―The 
major limitation is our ability to change what we‘re doing in response to the 
feedback.‖ (9:18). Tearfund‟s South Sudan programme was governed by the 
strategies and policies of donors, the GoSS and Tearfund UK, as well as by 
global standards and best practice. These tend to be more powerful factors in 
determining an NGO‟s actions than feedback from a beneficiary community. 
This was demonstrated in Aweil East where the community felt that the work of 
Tearfund could improve by upgrading one of the Primary Health Care Units 
(PHCU) to a Primary Health Care Centre (PHCC): ―...if they give us a PHCC, 
things will improve in the community‖ (34:23). But this conflicted with Tearfund‟s 
strategy at that time which was to slowly reduce their work in primary health 
care. The programmatic strategy for Tearfund‟s work in South Sudan, which 
was based on a number of different factors, took precedent over the opinions of 
the community in Aweil East. 
Another example came from the Aweil South project. In this instance the conflict 
was between the community‟s needs and the strategy of the donor. Feedback 
                                            
24
 This is the committee selected by the community to oversee a primary health care unit/ clinic. 
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received from the community indicated that more water points were needed in 
the area and this was verified by Tearfund staff. One of the donors expressed 
an interest in funding Tearfund to provide a certain number of new boreholes in 
the area. However, when the Haiti earthquake struck in January 2010, donor 
funds intended for South Sudan were diverted to Haiti. Tearfund was unable to 
source alternate funding and so the requests were unmet. 
One staff member of another agency captured this dilemma when she said, ―It 
starts with so many assumptions on their [beneficiaries‘] side and so many 
constraints on our side...‖ (36:56). Beneficiaries assume that NGOs have the 
resources and power to respond to them: ―...they believe an NGO has money... 
they know we are resourceful, we have the resources so when they cry out for 
help, we are always there and we can help. After all, we came here to help.‖ 
(13:72) and also confirmed by (14:51, 22:31). But as discussed in Section 
3.2.3.1.2, NGOs must work within the strategies of their more powerful 
stakeholders in order to survive and that means they lose the flexibility to be 
responsive to the less powerful. One interviewee put it like this: ―I have never 
seen a program that does [beneficiary] accountability that actually says, ‗You 
have some sort of power dynamic in this relationship‘." (5:38)  
The range of challenges identified by the interviewees underlines the complexity 
and demonstrates the elusiveness of the concept (as discussed in Section 
3.2.1). Furthermore, these are contrasted with the relative simplicity of the 
mechanisms implemented. As Tearfund‟s International Director said, ―I am 
increasingly conscious of a gap between aspiration and actual practice.‖ (6:30). 
Like many of the authors quoted in the Literature review, while desirable, 
accountability is difficult to put into practice and especially so within this context. 
5.3 The communities’ perception of beneficiary accountability 
Because of the complexity of translating accountability, the discussions with 
members of the community, local leaders and government authorities centred 
on their perception of Tearfund, the way Tearfund had conducted themselves, 
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the relationship they had, how problems were handled and how information was 
passed between Tearfund and the community.  
In general, NGOs were viewed favourably by members of the community. ―For 
me, I stay here because of NGOs on the ground‖ (29:14). This statement was 
made by an elder who had returned from a refugee camp in Sudan (the north) 
when he heard that an NGO had moved into the area (Aweil East). In a group 
discussion, a woman said, ―The people who work for Tearfund have come from 
far away because they are committed to working with the poor.‖ (31:12).  
―The way Tearfund does things is good for us. They allow us to comment and 
participate. Participation is good.‖ (34:18). The leader of the women‟s group in 
Aweil South said that Tearfund involved and worked together with the 
community, including leaders like herself (25:10); also confirmed by (27, 30, 
34). According to one group in Aweil East, Tearfund had involved the 
community right from the start of the project (which was well before 2007 and 
the roll out of beneficiary accountability mechanisms). They said that Tearfund 
met with the community to ask what was required. They told Tearfund what their 
priorities were and that is what Tearfund started to work on (27:22). They said: 
―It is good to consult the community.‖ (27:41). 
When discussing communication between Tearfund and the community, in 
contrast to the emphasis put on notice boards by the organisation, only one 
group of women in Aweil South actually mentioned the notice boards as a 
source of information (30:11) (also mentioned in Section 5.1.2) but none of the 
other community members referred to the boards. Three staff members referred 
to the low levels of literacy in the community as a hindrance to the use of notice 
boards (1, 2, 4). This point was confirmed by a Knowledge, Attitude and 
Practice (KAP) survey undertaken by the staff in Aweil East in December 2010 
which showed literacy levels to be 24% among men and just 1.8% among 
women. 
Instead of the notice boards, the methods of dissemination mentioned by 
interviewees included community meetings, information given via community 
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leaders or the Southern Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Commission (SSRRC) 
representative and written communication to government officials (25, 29, 30, 
32, 34). The method most frequently mentioned was the community meetings. 
The SSRRC representative in Aweil South described information from Tearfund 
as well-disseminated (23:14).  
However, the research showed that there was a difference in what people knew 
depending on whether they lived close to the Tearfund compound or in more 
remote villages. Information was not as well disseminated to beneficiaries in 
more distant villages. This was partly because information filtered out from the 
Tearfund compound to the people in the immediate vicinity informally and 
supplemented the information disseminated by more formal means.  
In addition, the more marginalised members of the community, such as the 
elderly, were not as well informed as others (35). In most cases, this was 
because they did not always attend community meetings. For example, an 
elderly man explained that he no longer attended community meetings because 
when he spoke, no-one listened to him (35:13).  
Similar to the notice boards, no interviewees mentioned complaints boxes as a 
method of feedback. When asked directly, the women‟s group in Aweil South 
said that they preferred verbal communication because if they used a 
complaints box ―...what would they do if they did not get a response?‖ (30:18). 
Staff in Aweil East felt that complaints boxes could be abused but that if 
someone took the time to come to the Tearfund compound, then the matter was 
serious (15:32). In Aweil South members of the community used the complaints 
mechanism to get back at local staff members by falsifying complaints (1:40, 
2:10) which seemed to happen in other areas as well (21:96). 
Instead, the preference was for verbal contact with Tearfund and this was 
typically via someone appointed to speak on behalf of others. In most cases this 
was the chief or elders (32:10, 34:4, 6): ―...they work through leaders, ...when 
there is something happen (sic), the community may report to the leaders and 
then the leaders come [to Tearfund].‖ (4:48).  
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Others spoke of the local staff members as representatives, for example the 
Aweil East Supervisor. “It is like there is a barrier or a limit between us and [the 
supervisor] is the one who fills that gap. He stands between us and Tearfund 
and acts as the representative for both.‖ (28:21). Also confirmed by (4:50, 
18:18).  
The use of one individual to represent the group was observed on a number of 
occasions during the research. At group meetings, one person would respond 
to all the questions. Others would only speak if specifically asked for their 
opinion. One group of women (32) told me that since they had appointed the 
speaker they were happy for her to answer the questions. This did not mean 
that the group remained silent; there was consultation when necessary.  
The elders explained that the use of a single representative was a way to 
present confidential information. They felt that if a complaint was brought by a 
representative, then Tearfund would not know where the original statement had 
come from (29:17). However, the translator felt that confidentiality was generally 
not a concern. He said that because people could not write, they spoke openly. 
He used the example of the research interviews and said that even with him 
present to translate, the people were not afraid to speak openly (4:64). This was 
confirmed in a number of other interviews (11:39, 28:18, 32:16).  
Regardless of what the reason was, the community preferred to use individuals 
appointed as representatives. Interestingly, the staff felt that this gave the 
representatives the power to manipulate or distort the messages (18:19). They 
preferred to receive information directly from the individual who had the query or 
complaint. 
In relation to complaints, interviewees explained the process which they would 
follow. First of all, the leaders would determine whether the problem was 
something which should be resolved within the community or whether it should 
be raised with the NGO (25:12, 27:38, 29:30). In both sites, people said that 
Tearfund operated an „open-door policy‟ which meant that whenever there was 
any problem they felt free to go straight to Tearfund and raise the issue (27:28) 
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(Also 4, 25, 30, 31, 32, 33). ―The Dinka are a frank people. They will tell you. If 
there is something in your heart, why keep it?‖ (23:28).  
In the event of a lack of response from the NGO, the next step would be to take 
the issue to the SSRRC (25, 27, 29) or the county commissioner (27, 29). The 
SSRRC representative interviewed agreed that as a last resort, they would be 
prepared to sanction an NGO (23:11). The Minister for Humanitarian Affairs and 
Disaster Management confirmed that the role of the commission is to act on 
behalf of the community: ―You know the community have the final say. When 
they say we are not comfortable with the NGOs, immediately my mandate is to 
make sure that I implement what they have said.‖ (20:30). 
However, the actions of the community appeared to contradict the complaints 
process. As already discussed (see Section 5.2.2, page 64), most interviewees 
were reluctant to mention problems between them and the NGO – they 
repeatedly claimed there had been no problems. But when problems did occur, 
the methods employed to deal with them were different from the process 
described above and circumvented the complaints mechanisms put in place by 
Tearfund.  
For example, during my visit to Aweil East in December 2010, there was a 
disagreement between the local traders and Tearfund. Tearfund had agreed to 
purchase seed from local farmers in the area for distribution to others as part of 
their livelihood project. In addition, agricultural hand tools were to be procured 
from local blacksmiths. The intention was to benefit the local market at the 
same time as saving the cost and logistics of procuring items from suppliers in 
one of the towns.  
This was communicated at a meeting and tenders were invited in keeping with 
Tearfund and the donor‟s procurement procedures. When the successful 
bidders were informed, some of the local traders took exception because they 
had not been awarded the whole tender themselves. They raised the issue with 
Tearfund staff who explained the process and made the documentation 
available for inspection. Although a fair process had been followed, the traders 
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were not happy and so they threatened the safety of the relocatable staff and 
„arrested‟ two of the local staff. The issue took over two weeks to resolve and 
forced Tearfund to compromise their own procurement systems – something 
which, as the most senior manager present, I had to approve on the grounds of 
staff security. 
This incident occurred within the same two week period in which the chief told 
me that: ―Tearfund are like friends to us - they come and help us in our homes 
just like a friend does. Therefore I cannot allow you to be mistreated.‖ (28:21). 
In my opinion, threatening the safety of Tearfund staff was mistreatment but 
obviously that was not the chief‟s perception. This illustrated the difference in 
our interpretation of the same incident. 
In a separate incident, the community heard that Tearfund was building a base 
in the closest town to Aweil East. Instead of approaching Tearfund to ask for 
clarification, they went directly to the commissioner to ask whether Tearfund 
were moving out of the area. Since the building of the base was not going to 
affect the work in Aweil East, it had not occurred to the AC to inform the 
community or the commissioner. Nevertheless, the community were upset 
about the decision having been made without consultation. This incident is very 
similar to one which is related by Deal (2010) in Section 3.3. 
The third example was given by the Food Security Project Officer in Aweil 
South. Farmers who disagreed with new methods of farming had a way of 
communicating this: ―...they will not say directly to us but ...they will withdraw 
slowly.‖ (14:63).  
These three examples show that the community had ways of dealing with 
problems which circumvented the mechanisms provided for giving feedback. 
Perhaps more importantly, the staff expected more direct communication from 
the community and were confused by the indirect methods used. A Sudanese 
staff member summarised it as follows, ―...even if we can find a methodology of 
doing something so that we are accountable ...People come with a different 
interest, not the interest we want them to take‖ (13:52). 
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The difference between the NGO‟s perception of the accountability mechanisms 
and those of the community are shown in Table 5. 
NGO Community/ beneficiaries 
Honest feedback is expected. It is more important save face (or avoid 
shame) than to express the truth. 
Where formal accountability 
mechanisms are provided, it is 
expected that these would be used: 
1. By individuals; 
2. Before using alternate methods. 
Where formal mechanisms are 
provided: 
1. Feedback was provided via 
representatives, not by individuals. 
2. Other methods were often used 
instead of the NGO‟s mechanisms. 
The nature and likely impact of a 
decision determines the level of 
engagement with the community.  
Regardless of the nature or likely 
impact of the decision, the community 
want to be consulted. 
When a decision is dependent on 
other factors or stakeholders, the NGO 
expects that to be understood by the 
community. 
Community expect to be able to 
influence a decision regardless of 
other stakeholders or factors and, in 
the extreme, will resort to vengeance. 
Mechanisms are set up to provide 
confidentiality and to follow a 
procedure with complete impartiality. 
The preference is for relationship and 
patronage. 
Table 5: Contrast between the NGO and the beneficiaries' view of 
accountability mechanisms 
5.3.1.1 Community leadership 
In order to understand the accountability structures in place within the 
community, I asked about leadership, decision making and power-holders. A 
group of leaders in Aweil East explained the process through which a chief is 
elected: 
The community will meet and discuss the potential candidate and his strengths. 
Once they have held the discussion they will agree and that constitutes a vote. 
The elected person will then ask the community, „Do you want me to work with 
you as you have elected me?‟ If the community agrees, then he is elected and 
becomes the leader. The candidate also has the right to decline (28:08). 
According to another interviewee, government authorities also have a say in 
who is elected and therefore they would also be consulted (22:10). 
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The leaders said that the characteristics that are desirable in a chief are: 
1. They must be able to address issues so that there is harmony in 
the community. 
2. They must be able to bring peace and security.  
3. They must be able to deal with bad behaviour among the 
community. (For example, if some members of the community 
want to fight with another tribe, the leader should be able to calm 
them down and in that way, ensure peace.) 
4. They should be able to represent the community to the 
government. (28:14) 
The emphasis on harmony and peace supports information contained in Section 
3.3. 
When discussing the election of a leader, one of the elders said that if a good 
man is poor, it is unlikely that he will be elected as chief because people want 
him to be in a position to help them financially (28:5). The group agreed that this 
is unfortunate but it is common. This point was also made in Section 3.3, page 
31 and confirmed by a key informant (21:74). 
Having been elected, a chief can also be held to account through a process 
which can result in him losing his position. A meeting will be called where the 
community will present their grievances. The chief then has a chance to explain 
himself or give an answer. He can accept the community‟s demands and 
therefore will be allowed to continue. However, if he refuses and continues in 
his ways, they will re-elect someone else (28:10). There were no examples 
given so it was not clear how often this happens. 
When asked about decision making, a number of interviewees talked about it 
being a consultative process during which any member of the community had 
the opportunity to speak including women and children (25:14, 30:20, 32:14, 
34:16) (also mentioned in Section 3.3). Once the consultation is complete, the 
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final decision is made by the chief. ―Once the chief...makes a decision, that‘s 
final ...There is a chain, a process with his other executive members. After they 
have all said, ‗Now Chief, you can decide,‘ he decides and they agree with that 
and the community listen.‖ (13:56).  
The women‟s group in Aweil South said that the consultative process of 
decision-making gave everyone the power to make decisions (30:24). But, as 
already discussed (see page 69), one elderly man felt his voice was not heard 
at the meetings. Similarly, in a different village, two widows said that while they 
were allowed to offer their opinion, they knew that their views were not often 
considered (32:14).  
Chiefs were not the only leaders to employ a consultative process in making 
decisions. Church leaders also used consultative processes and were willing to 
explain their decision if questioned (4:72, 26:10). Similarly, the SSRRC 
representative spoke of his preference for consultation (23:11). Interviewees 
said that it was their experience that NGOs also consulted the community when 
making decisions that affected them (30:22, 27:41). ―Meeting is very important - 
it can achieve many things.‖ (29:10). 
Deng's (1984) opinion on the centrality of „cieng‟ in the culture was confirmed by 
the supervisor at Aweil East. He said that it is very much a part of Dinka culture 
and translated it as „living‟ but agreed that there can be good or bad „cieng‟. He 
also said that it is „cieng‟ that makes a Dinka respect a human being. This 
includes dignity, respect, compassion and equality. He said that in practice it 
means that the Dinka will respect and relate to the individual staff members 
instead of the organisation.   
Without being able to ask the community members directly whether or not they 
considered the mechanisms to constitute accountability, my observation was 
that they did not. Their preferences for interaction were clearly different in that 
they sought relationship rather than systems. They preferred not to say what 
was wrong or what they disagreed with but they had their own way of 
communicating that. When they felt they had been wronged, they tended 
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towards vengeance rather than consultation with the NGO as shown by the 
example of the traders in Aweil East (see page 71) and as discussed in Section 
3.3 (see page 31). 
5.4 Summary 
There were a number of factors that influenced the implementation of 
beneficiary accountability in Tearfund‟s South Sudan programme (see Table 6 
for a summary).  
Influencing 
factor 
Demonstrated by... Results in... 
Complexity Different definitions Accountability viewed as a 
project 
Subjective interpretation 
(accountability webs) 
Difficult to measure 
accountability 
Staff misconceptions Staff feel undermined/ 
mistrusted 
Culture Staff perception (positive or 
negative) 
Different understanding/ 
division among staff 
Community reluctance to give 
negative feedback 
Mechanisms have limited 
use/ meaning 
Emphasis on relationships Importance of the 
individuals versus the 
organisation 
Context Reference to time constraints Focus on the process 
Staff turnover Loss of relationship with 
community 
Task-oriented environment Viewed as a project 
Power Influence of donor/ NGO 
strategies, host government 
policies 
Limited responsiveness of 
NGO to beneficiaries 
Community reluctance to give 
direct feedback 
Use of intermediary  
Table 6: Factors that influenced implementation 
These findings demonstrate the gap between the concept and the practice 
which was mentioned in the Introduction Chapter (see Section 1.3). The 
concept, which is complex and abstract, is not always understood and it is not 
easy to implement in a task-oriented context. It is not surprising, perhaps, that 
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the beneficiaries seemed to prefer their own means of holding Tearfund to 
account rather than the mechanisms offered to them. 
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6 Discussion 
6.1 Introduction 
The aim of this research was to analyse the factors influencing the 
implementation of beneficiary accountability in an NGO‟s relief programme in 
two Dinka communities in South Sudan. The research found a wide range of 
different factors but a number of these were linked to the complexity of the 
concept and the insufficient consideration given to that during implementation. 
Others were related to problems specific to beneficiary accountability; problems 
which are inherent and very difficult to resolve. 
6.2 The complexity 
Tearfund‟s concern for accountability of humanitarian NGOs was demonstrated 
by their willingness to adopt the HAP principles (see Section 5.1). Translating 
these good intentions into reality involved broadening existing accountability to 
include all stakeholders. The existing systems were aimed at the more powerful 
stakeholders like financial supporters or the Board of Directors and tended to 
employ managerial accountability processes. With the inclusion of new 
stakeholders, the beneficiaries, for example, new systems needed to be 
developed. 
At the head office, Tearfund‟s approach to implementation was fairly 
comprehensive, for example, in developing training materials, piloting different 
approaches and capturing what was learnt (see Section 5.1). Training materials 
explained and justified the need for beneficiary accountability as well as setting 
out the steps to implementation. But the perception of staff responsible for 
implementation was that it was predominantly about complaints boxes and 
notice boards (see page 49). This would indicate that the emphasis in the 
materials was wrong (too much on the „how‟ and not enough on the „what‟) or 
that the staff chose to focus more on the process than the concept itself. From 
the findings, it seemed to be a combination of both. 
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The complexity contained within the English word „accountability‟ was not 
considered in the implementation. Tearfund‟s materials only included HAP‟s 
definition and added a few extra lines to explain accountability in light of 
humanitarian assistance. It would seem that like a lot of authors, Tearfund‟s 
head office staff made the assumption that everyone knows what accountability 
is about and why it‟s desirable (Dubnick, 1998). The majority of the materials 
only explained how to implement beneficiary accountability but didn‟t explain 
either the specific or the broader concept in any depth. The result was shown in 
the diverse definitions given by staff, the subjective interpretation of 
accountability as demonstrated by the accountability webs and the 
misconceptions held by some staff for whom the meaning was literally lost in 
translation. 
In addition, staff seemed to choose to focus more on the process than the 
concept. From my professional experience and from the findings of this 
research I believe that one reason is the time constraints within which 
humanitarian staff operate (see Section 5.2.2.1). The heavy workloads mean 
that there is a tendency to focus on exactly what has to be done – it is a very 
task-oriented environment. So even for those who understood accountability, 
negotiating the complexity was difficult amidst the busyness of a humanitarian 
programme. But more importantly, it is easier to report on the tangible 
mechanisms implemented than on the more intangible aspects of accountability 
such as the quality of the relationship between the NGO and the community 
(see Tearfund‟s definition on page 24). As a member of another NGO said, it is 
difficult to measure accountability because it is subjective (see page 60). It is a 
lot easier to report that a notice board has been put up and is being used to 
publish project information to the community. As a result, accountability was 
seen to be a project rather than a paradigm. 
In the South Sudan programme the emphasis on the process was evident from 
the start. The Operations Manager noted that the accountability officer hired to 
roll out beneficiary accountability seemed to focus on activities such as putting 
notice boards up, while the actual concept was not well communicated to the 
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staff (9:6). The resulting misconceptions held by some staff were a factor that 
hindered the ability of the accountability officers to do their job. Their colleagues 
viewed them as policing agents and refused to support them. As one officer 
said, ―The problem is not with the beneficiaries but with the staff‖ (1: 38). At the 
same time, individual staff members played a significant role both as those who 
motivated implementation, such as the new AC in Aweil East (see Section 
5.1.1), and as those with whom the community connected, such as the 
accountability officer in Aweil South (see Section 5.1.2). 
Since the roll out of beneficiary accountability in 2007, Tearfund‟s materials 
have incorporated the learning from their experiences and improved. The Field 
Guide talks about the need to contextualise accountability mechanisms, to 
consider the requirements of different groups within each community (for 
example, elderly people) and to ensure that staff fully understand the concept 
as well as the practice. But in spite of this, during the research period, the focus 
was still on the latter. 
The mechanisms implemented by Tearfund were closely associated with the 
HAP benchmarks and are typically classified as components of managerial 
accountability. So while the specific mechanisms differed, it was essentially the 
same type of accountability employed for the beneficiaries as for the donors and 
Board of Directors. But since the aim of managerial accountability is usually to 
allow for control from a distance (Hilhorst, 2003), it is not the most appropriate 
type of accountability for an NGO to employ towards their beneficiaries. 
Furthermore, it seemed that the Dinka community did not recognise these 
systems as accountability. They were, however, familiar with moral 
accountability which they demonstrated through their adherence to the 
principles of „cieng‟. Perhaps this would have been a better type of 
accountability to employ towards this community. 
The insufficient attention given to the complexity may be one of the reasons 
why the gap between the concept and the day-to-day implementation still 
remains. This multi-faceted, multi-directional, chameleon-like concept has been 
simplified into a set of steps which, within the time-pressured world of 
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humanitarian assistance, have quickly become „accountability‟ but, when 
compared to the definition, there is little basis for this equation. 
6.3 Structural difficulties  
The insufficient consideration given to the complexity is not the only reason for 
the limited success in implementation: There are underlying complications with 
the concept of beneficiary accountability. 
Firstly, a key component of accountability is answerability which requires 
agreement between the NGO and their beneficiaries on what constitutes 
acceptable behaviour (see Section 3.2.1.1). As one interviewee said, ―...if you're 
accountable to somebody, you are responsible to them for whatever it is that 
has been agreed between the two parties.‖ (10:6). The HAP benchmarks 
specify that beneficiary communities must give consent to any project activities 
before they are undertaken but beneficiaries have very limited influence on what 
activities are carried out (see page 66). These are determined by the strategies 
of the NGOs and their donors and therefore it is likely that, at best, beneficiaries 
can refuse to allow an NGO to carry out some or all of their activities in that 
area. 
But this problem can never be resolved because although beneficiaries are the 
raison d‟être for NGOs, they cannot ensure the work of an NGO continues – 
only the financial donors can do that. As Uphoff (1995. p. 21) puts it, ―Thus, 
proponents of ‗making NGOs accountable to their beneficiaries‘ face a structural 
constraint that cannot easily be done away with, however commendable this 
might be according to certain democratic or normative theories.‖ 
In addition, beneficiaries do not set the standards by which NGOs work (see 
Section 5.2.2.4). These are set by national and international bodies and laws. 
While most beneficiaries would agree to the majority of these standards, it is 
possible that they do not agree with all of them. For example, the Dinka Malual 
are a patriarchal society and therefore are unlikely to agree with gender equality 
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standards. During the research, there was no evidence that these standards 
were discussed in any depth with the Dinka community. 
Arguably, it is not necessary for beneficiaries to agree with these standards; this 
is one of the stakeholder conflicts that make NGO accountability extremely 
difficult, as discussed (Sections 1.2 and 3.2.2). But working to standards with 
which beneficiary communities might disagree is essentially an imposition of 
foreign values, a point raised by The Listening Project (see Section 3.2.3.2). 
The more important point, however, is the absence of agreement because this 
is essential to answerability, one of the main components of accountability. 
Secondly, enforceability, also a key component of accountability, is missing in 
the relationship between and NGO and those they are assisting. Even if there 
was agreement on what is acceptable, there is no way for beneficiaries to 
sanction an NGO whose performance falls below what has been agreed. It is 
only possible for NGOs to be held accountable and to make themselves 
accountable to stakeholders who have the power to impose some form of 
sanctions in the event of failure. But beneficiaries, such as the Dinka 
communities in this research, do not have that power, a point which HAP 
themselves make (see Section 3.2.3). 
It is interesting to note that in most of the discussions, community members 
referred to the role of the SSRRC in monitoring NGO activities. It was their 
belief that the SSRRC, or the local commissioner, would act on their behalf if 
necessary (see page 70). This use of an intermediary is similar to the way that 
the Dinka people rely on their chief to mediate with other tribes or with 
government, for example (see Section 5.3.1.1). Clearly, they expected NGOs to 
be held to account and they seemed comfortable with a patron, a stakeholder 
with power, being the one to mediate on their behalf. This is a possible solution 
to this particular problem and was in fact suggested in the Rwandan report 
(Steering Committee of the Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to 
Rwanda, 1996) (see Study III, chapter 9). However, this would nevertheless 
constitute accountability to the intermediary and only indirectly to the 
beneficiaries themselves.  
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Finally, community members interviewed in this research showed a reluctance 
to provide honest, negative feedback to an NGO (see page 64). This is not the 
case in all contexts: A few interviewees gave examples of other contexts where 
beneficiaries were comfortable using complaints mechanisms. But in South 
Sudan, criticising the NGOs who were providing much-needed services was 
counter-intuitive; it‟s a culture where saving face is more important than 
honesty. This was captured by one of the key informants who said: “I would say 
that truth is another concept that we [Westerners] don't share with the Dinka...‖ 
(22:35). In contrast to the expectation inherent in complaints mechanisms – that 
feedback will be honest – in the Dinka culture, openly expressing a complaint 
cuts across their central principles of unity, harmony and respect. These are the 
principles of „cieng‟ (see Section 3.3).  
Without honest community engagement, feedback mechanisms and 
participatory approaches have little value in terms of accountability. This opinion 
was expressed by seven of the interviewees. If the community won‟t honestly 
express their wishes, concerns and opinions, the NGO can only assume how to 
be accountable.  
6.3.1  Culture's influence on accountability 
The influence of culture on accountability goes beyond the reluctance to offer 
negative feedback. The fundamental differences between the way that people 
from collectivistic and individualistic societies communicate and determine 
acceptable behaviour make it very difficult to develop cross-cultural 
accountability mechanisms. 
In collectivistic societies, what constitutes acceptable behaviour tends to be well 
known within the community (see Section 3.2.3.1.1). It becomes known through 
discussions, meetings and the transfer of information via the close networks of 
kinship and other forms of alliance within the society. Within this context, the 
emotion of shame is often a strong motivator with the result that exposing failure 
is avoided. This point was made in the Literature review (see Section 3.2.3.1.1) 
and also restated strongly by one of the key informants who spoke about the 
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reluctance to bring shame to anyone, but especially to a foreigner (see Section 
5.2.2.3). 
This is in contrast to individualistic societies where guilt tends to be a stronger 
motivator. Since guilt often triggers a desire to make amends, the exposure of 
information is seen as a positive step towards reparation. In this type of society 
systematic, well-documented accountability mechanisms which rely on 
transparency, impartiality and truth are commonly employed. 
Speaking of this contrast, one of the key informants put it this way:  ―...[in 
Sudan] it goes back to relationships, and NGOs don't like this because we're so 
open and transparent, everything must be systematic, it can't be based on 
relationships. But in fact, it should be.‖ (21:109)  
The important point is that the type of accountability documented in this 
research works in a guilt-motivated, individualistic society where people are 
familiar with democratic ideals of holding delegated authority to account. Many 
humanitarian NGOs are based in this type of society because this is the most 
common among developed nations. But these ideas do not prevail – and indeed 
may not even exist – in a shame-motivated, collectivistic society which is more 
common in developing nations. And these countries are where humanitarian 
assistance is most often needed. Chew and Greer (1997) and Velayutham and 
Perera (2004) argue that to implement Western, individualistic accountability 
mechanisms in collectivistic societies can be counter-productive. 
The insufficient consideration given to culture‟s influence on an individual‟s 
interpretation of accountability has played a part in making implementation 
difficult, especially for international NGOs. Similarly, the other structural 
difficulties inherent in beneficiary accountability combine to make it particularly 
challenging to implement effectively. Furthermore, when the efforts made to 
adhere to the HAP standards are considered, the audience for those efforts is 
questionable. 
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6.4 The real audience 
The formation of HAP and the rapid growth in their membership is a signal of 
the good intentions of NGOs such as Tearfund. Clearly, members are 
concerned about abuses like those reported in the Rwandan report (see Section 
2.3.1) and have sought to broaden their accountability to include their 
beneficiaries. 
But HAP is a self-regulatory body and membership is voluntary meaning that 
those NGOs who choose not to join an organisation like HAP remain 
unregulated. Essentially, they could continue to deliver aid in a vacuum of 
accountability without sanction. Even those who are members of HAP face very 
limited sanction in the event of failure as one interviewee pointed out: ―HAP 
doesn't have any power over us [NGOs] and also the community doesn't have 
any power over us. So it [beneficiary accountability] just remains the concept.‖ 
(12:123). 
The difference is that organisations who seek some form of accreditation are 
looking for a means to separate themselves from others, to indicate that they 
are credible and trustworthy organisations. It‟s a way to signal their virtue 
(Gugerty, 2009). As HAP puts it, “The value of certification is the confidence 
and trust that is established by an impartial and competent assessment by HAP 
auditors”. (HAP International, 2010b) 
Notwithstanding that HAP-certification does indeed indicate that an organisation 
has both the means and standards to reach that distinction, the question 
relevant to this research is, „For whom is that signalling most relevant?‟ The 
recipients of humanitarian assistance, such as the Dinka communities in this 
research, don‟t need a certification stamp to tell them whether an NGO is good 
or bad. And importantly, it would be unlikely to help them even if they did know, 
since they seldom have a choice over which NGO delivers aid to them. So, 
again, who is the certification for? 
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As discussed in the Literature Review (see Section 3.2.3.1.3), often there is a 
distance between those who fund and those who deliver aid. Funders rely 
largely on information provided to them in order to determine the effectiveness 
of an NGO‟s activities. This usually comes in the form of reports and 
publications which are the NGO‟s own interpretation of the reality. It is this 
audience who would appreciate additional evidence of an organisation‟s 
credibility and trustworthiness. And therefore, the audience for beneficiary 
accountability is the NGO‟s financial contributors not the recipients of the aid. 
This is not to say that mechanisms such as those being implemented by 
Tearfund would not benefit the recipient community because they would. These 
mechanisms are simply good practice for an NGO delivering aid. In fact, a 
number of interviewees referred to the fact that most of the mechanisms 
implemented were not new (for example see page 49) but rather it was the 
equation of these with beneficiary accountability which was new: ―...very often it 
is part of what [NGOs] are doing already, it's just framed in different 
terminology.‖ (37:11) 
6.5 Conclusion 
This research began by asking two questions: 
1. Can an organisation certified by HAP truly claim to be accountable 
to their beneficiaries? 
2. Are the mechanisms implemented in the name of beneficiary 
accountability appreciated by the beneficiaries themselves, or are 
they more attractive to the donors and supporters of the NGO?   
As a result of this research, it is my opinion that within this context even HAP-
certified organisations cannot truly claim to be accountable to their beneficiaries 
because of the structural difficulties discussed in this chapter. 
Secondly, within this specific context, since the beneficiaries did not use the 
mechanisms provided to hold Tearfund to account, it is unlikely that they viewed 
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them to indeed be accountability mechanisms. ―It‘s only accountability if that 
community say it is accountability‖ (9:8). In contrast, during my time in South 
Sudan, a number of donor representatives expressed their approval of 
Tearfund‟s HAP-certification. So my conclusion is that the mechanisms 
implemented by Tearfund were appreciated more by the financial supporters 
than by the beneficiaries. 
6.6 Summary 
The intentions of the NGOs, as signalled by their membership of HAP and other 
similar initiatives, are important considerations for their supporters and critics. 
These „signals of virtue‟ are not only indicators of trustworthiness but also of the 
mission and values of these organisations; they set an organisation apart from 
others (Gugerty, 2009). Adherence to the sort of standards set out by HAP is a 
form of professional accountability which is valid and necessary just as different 
types of accountability are necessary for an NGO‟s different stakeholders. 
But what is also necessary is for NGOs to recognise the complexity of 
accountability; the valuable and largely untapped learning on the 
implementation of accountability in the public sector; and, most importantly, 
what it is that the beneficiaries themselves actually want. 
This research has contributed to the gap in the literature by providing an in-
depth study of the challenges faced by NGOs implementing accountability to 
the recipients of their assistance. Rather than simply discussing its desirability, 
this thesis addresses some of the difficult questions about one of the new „acts 
of faith‟25 of the humanitarian aid world. Considering the importance of the 
subject and its current popularity, more work is needed and specific 
recommendations are outlined in the final chapter. 
 
                                            
25
 See reference on page 26. 
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7 Recommendations 
In this final chapter, recommendations are made for NGOs, for HAP and similar 
initiatives, and for academics and donors.  
7.1 NGOs 
Although it is very challenging, and in certain situations impossible, to truly be 
accountable to recipients of assistance, it is possible to improve NGO 
accountability in general; to improve NGO staff‟s understanding of 
accountability; and to increase the involvement of community members. The 
following recommendations are made in relation to these three areas. 
1. Carry out and document an „accountability stakeholder‟ analysis. Considering 
the challenge of identifying an NGO‟s primary stakeholder (see Section 3.2.2), it 
is essential to map the different stakeholders to whom accountability is due. 
Ideally, this should show how conflicts would be resolved but it may not be 
possible to anticipate all of these. Importantly, the document must be 
disseminated to all staff as well as to stakeholders. This will help staff to 
understand their responsibilities more clearly; it will demonstrate the 
organisation‟s commitment to all stakeholders; and assist in determining the 
different types of accountability which are required. 
2. Different types of accountability are needed for different stakeholders (see 
page 23). While most NGOs automatically employ a range of different 
mechanisms, it would be useful to document these and define what type of 
accountability they reflect, for example, managerial or professional. Being 
deliberate about the type of accountability employed for each stakeholder group 
will help staff to understand the breadth of the concept. Furthermore, making 
this information available to all stakeholders will increase the transparency of 
the organisation. (See Day and Klein (1987) for more information on the types 
of accountability.) 
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3. Put greater emphasis on the meaning of „accountability‟ when training staff. 
The evidence shows that a common understanding of „accountability‟ is often 
assumed. However, this assumption is inaccurate. The concept is complex and 
difficult to understand particularly when translated (see Sections 3.2.1 and 
5.2.1). Therefore, ensuring that there is a common understanding of the word is 
essential – even among those whose first language is English. Materials and 
training should focus on explaining the concept itself rather than the 
practicalities of implementation. Particular attention should be given to allaying 
concerns that accountability mechanisms are really a type of policing 
mechanism. 
4. Ensure that all staff are clear about their roles and responsibilities. Given the 
time constraints of the humanitarian operating environment, it is important to 
clarify the tasks necessary to ensure accountability to all stakeholders. This 
should be more detailed than what is included in a typical job description. For 
example, in South Sudan, the PD developed a matrix to show who was 
responsible for what in the cycle of producing donor proposals and reports. 
5. Appoint field-based staff whose role is to liaise with the community. Although 
this research showed that „accountability officers‟ were perceived as policemen, 
there are a number of ways to avoid this. Firstly, avoid the use of the word 
„accountability‟ in the job title. Given that it is not easily translated, it may be 
misunderstood. In addition it perpetuates the misconception that accountability 
is a project which can be implemented. Secondly, recruit people with the right 
attitude and personality for the job. They should not be task-oriented but 
relational, respectful and compassionate (see section 3.2.3.2). Thirdly, allow 
these staff the time it takes to develop relationships and trust. Recognise that it 
will be difficult to define and even more difficult to report on this role because it 
will be variable and subjective. 
The appointment of these staff should not reduce the responsibility of other field 
staff to develop good relationships with members of the community in which 
they are working. Tearfund staff repeatedly said that the way they as individuals 
approached the community was very important (11, 13, 14, 15, 21). They said 
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their relationships with the community determined the level of participation and 
engagement. More importantly, the community themselves attached 
significance to individuals with whom they had developed relationship and trust 
(for example, see page 63). 
6. Consider implementing moral rather than managerial accountability to 
recipient communities within collectivistic societies. This would be far more 
effective and more likely to be recognised as accountability by the community 
themselves. However, it would involve dedicating time to understanding the 
culture and developing relationships which would be very difficult to achieve in 
an emergency relief setting and would require dedicated personnel (as already 
mentioned). Furthermore since this type of accountability is relational and 
subjective, it is very difficult to measure or report on. Nevertheless, if an NGO 
considers their beneficiaries to be their primary stakeholders, then it is 
necessary to find accountability mechanisms which are recognised as such by 
the community themselves. For more information on moral accountability, see 
Hilhorst (2003). 
7.2 HAP and similar initiatives 
1. Draw attention to the complexity of accountability in training materials and 
training courses. This research found that the lack of a common understanding 
among staff created a number of challenges to the implementation (see Section 
6.2). Help trainees to understand the concept and the complexity contained 
within it. 
2. More comprehensive research into the links between accountability 
mechanisms and improved quality of aid would be useful to NGOs and donors 
alike. Since there is such a close link in HAP‟s materials, it would make sense if 
the research was facilitated or at least published by HAP. 
3. The participation debate has thrown up some very similar concerns to this 
research and if discussions have not already taken place, it would be worth 
 92 
engaging with those involved (for example, see Cooke and Kothari (2001)). 
Here there is scope for sharing learning and solving common problems. 
4. As mentioned in the Discussion chapter, there is some valuable learning 
available from the public sector, for example, the National Health Service (NHS) 
in the UK. Although the working environment is so different, the challenges 
faced are very similar. Since a lot of the lessons learnt have been well 
documented, this information would be helpful to NGOs and could easily be 
disseminated to them via a website. Some such articles are listed under both 
the References and Bibliography sections. 
5. It would be useful to clarify the different types of accountability – specifically 
managerial, moral and professional – in training materials. NGOs should 
employ a combination of these for different stakeholders and having this 
information made available through training materials or short articles would be 
useful.  
6. HAP should work with member organisations that are willing to pilot different 
types of accountability in different cultures. Specifically, versions of moral 
accountability should be trialled within humanitarian programmes in collectivistic 
societies. 
7.3 Academics and donors 
1. Apart from the additional research which is mentioned under HAP‟s section 
above, it would also be worth supporting work like The Listening Project. The 
views and opinions of the recipients of aid and development are presently not 
well represented (see Section 3.2.3.2). Having more insight into these views 
would help NGOs and donors to improve aid effectiveness. 
2. Further study of the influence of culture on accountability and how this might 
affect the work of NGOs is crucial. It would be best carried out by academics 
since it should be an in-depth study possibly carried out by researchers with an 
anthropological focus. The usefulness of such research would reach beyond the 
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NGO sector to the public and private sectors given the influence of globalisation 
and the multi-cultural nature of most workplaces today.  
3. A comparative study of the challenges faced by NGOs and those already 
well-documented by the public sector in developed countries such as the UK 
would be useful. This could be done as a short study and published as a journal 
article. 
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APPENDICES 
Appendix A Interview questions 
A.1 General staff Juba and field: 
 What does accountability mean to you? 
 Who are you accountable to? (Accountability web.) 
 What do you understand by the term „beneficiary accountability‟? 
 Where and when did you learn about it? 
 How is beneficiary accountability implemented in the programme? (who 
implements, who decides, how, what)?  
 Why is it implemented (in your opinion)? 
 What makes it effective (or not)? 
 If it was up to you, what would you do to make sure we are accountable 
to beneficiaries? 
A.2 Leadership Juba level: 
 What is your understanding of the term beneficiary accountability? 
(Discuss terminology) 
 What was/is being done within the programme to implement beneficiary 
accountability? 
 Who is responsible for what in terms of implementation? 
 In your experience, what helps and what hinders implementation? 
 What would/do you consider as successful implementation? (examples) 
 If it was up to you, what would you do to ensure that Tearfund is 
accountable to our beneficiaries? 
A.3 UK based staff: 
 What do you understand by the term beneficiary accountability? (Discuss 
terminology) 
 What steps are taken in operational programmes to implement 
accountability? 
 Who is responsible for what in terms of implementation? 
 What do you consider as successful implementation? (examples) 
 What are some of the factors that contribute to successful 
implementation? 
 If it was up to you, what would you do (change) to ensure that Tearfund 
is accountable to our beneficiaries? 
A.4 Community members: 
 What do you know about Tearfund? 
 What information does Tearfund give you? 
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 How do they give you the information? 
 Can you give me an example of when you have given information to 
Tearfund? 
 What can you do if there is a problem and Tearfund do not resolve the 
problem? 
 How are decisions made in this community? 
 Who has power to make decisions? 
A.5 Other agency staff 
The aim was to leave this as unstructured as possible allowing the interviewee 
to introduce their learning and their thoughts. The following questions were only 
used as guidance if necessary. 
 What is your general opinion of beneficiary accountability? (discuss 
terminology) 
 What works well when implementing accountability mechanisms? 
 What model do you use? (look for who is responsible for what, how they 
train staff, etc.) 
 More specifically, do you try to explain the concept itself to beneficiaries 
or do you just implement it? If you explain it, how do you do that? 
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Appendix B Details of Interviewees 
No Name Nationality Gender Designation/Group Site* Type of 
meeting 
Date held Duration 
Tearfund staff 
1 Rebecca 
Mutuku 
Kenyan F Accountability Officer AS Semi-
structured 
interview 
10/10/2009 2hrs 
2 Ambaye 
Zekewos 
Ethiopian M Area Coordinator AS Semi-
structured 
interview 
05/11/2010 37 mins 
3 Dorothy 
Muchaki 
Kenyan F Health Project Manager AS Unstructured 
interview 
18/04/2010 12 mins 
4 Emmanuel 
Achual 
Sudanese M Senior Accountability Supervisor AE Semi-
structured 
interview 
30/03/2010 28 mins 
5 Kelsey Hoppe American F Deputy Programme Director (Nov 
2008 - Aug 2009) 
J Semi-
structured 
interview 
24/01/2010 33 mins 
6 David 
Bainbridge 
British M International Director UK Semi-
structured 
interview 
23/08/2010 26 mins 
7 Ben Webster British M Operations Officer for Southern 
Sudan and Afghanistan 
UK Semi-
structured 
interview 
23/08/2010 29 mins 
8 Girma Foggi Ethiopian M Area Coordinator (Jan 2010 - 
present) 
AE Unstructured 
interview 
23/03/2010 45 mins 
9 Jon Kennedy British M Operations Manager for Southern 
Sudan and Afghanistan 
UK Semi-
structured 
01/09/2010 31 mins 
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interview 
10 Jane Petty British F Programme Director (Dec 2009 - 
Nov 2010) 
J Semi-
structured 
interview 
07/08/2010 49 mins 
11 Jane Juan, 
Selina Ayangi 
Sudanese F Nutrition Nurses AS Semi-
structured 
interview 
10/05/2010 18 mins 
12 Edward 
Santiago 
Sri Lankan M Deputy Programme Director (Sept 
2009 - Nov 2010); Programme 
Director (Dec 2010 - Mar 2011) 
J Semi-
structured 
interview 
05/08/2010 37 mins 
13 Carol Aporo Sudanese F WATSAN engineer AE Semi-
structured 
interview 
25/03/2010 25 mins 
14 Taban Simon 
Stanley 
Sudanese M Food Security Project Officer AS Semi-
structured 
interview 
26/03/2010 26 mins 
15 Aweil East 
team 
  Project Manager, Food Security 
Project Officer, Area Logistics 
Officer, Health Promotion Project 
Officer, Health Project Officer 
AE Focus group 
discussion 
29/03/2010 55 mins 
16 Michael Bimo Sudanese M Accountability Officer AE Unstructured 
interview 
03/12/2010  
17 Senior 
Management 
Team (SMT) 
Sudanese  4 females, 7 males from the SMT 
and additional 1 female and 1 male 
staff. 
J Focus group 
discussion 
27/12/2010 1hr 10 
mins 
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18 Aweil East 
team 
Sudanese  Project Manager, WASH Project 
Officer, WASH Engineer, Food 
Security Project Officer, Human 
Resources Administrator, 
Accountability Officer, Health 
Systems Project Officer, Health 
Promotion Project Officer 
AE Focus group 
discussion 
29/11/2010 1hr 45 
mins 
19 Accountability 
extension 
workers 
Sudanese M 3 male staff members AE Semi-
structured 
interview 
04/12/2010  
Independent opinions 
20 His Excellency, 
James Kok 
Ruer 
Sudanese M The Minister of Humanitarian 
Affairs and Disaster Management, 
GoSS 
 Semi-
structured 
interview 
30/12/2010 29  mins 
21 John Ashworth British M Worked in Sudan since 1983 in 
emergency relief, development, 
education, peace, political analysis 
and advocacy with church-related 
agencies 
 Semi-
structured 
interview 
19/03/2010 54 mins 
22 Father Michael 
Barton 
American M Catholic Priest working among 
Dinka Malual for more than a 
decade and in South Sudan for 
longer 
 Semi-
structured 
interview 
14/12/2010 19 mins 
Community leaders 
23 Kon Manyang Sudanese M Former Deputy Secretary of the 
SSRRC in Aweil South 
AS Semi-
structured 
interview 
12/05/2010 20 mins 
24 Simon Akuei 
Door 
Sudanese M County Agricultural Department 
Head 
AS Semi-
structured 
interview 
10/05/2010 15 mins 
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25 Mary Achol Sudanese F Leader of the women's group and 
government employee (payam 
level) 
AS Semi-
structured 
interview 
11/05/2010 23 mins 
26 Catholic church 
leaders 
Sudanese M Priest and 2 leaders AS Semi-
structured 
interview 
11/05/2010 48 mins 
27 Church leaders Sudanese  9 male and 4 female leaders AE Focus group 
discussion 
13/05/2010 1hr 13 
mins 
28 Chief and 
elders 
Sudanese M 8 leaders all male AE Focus group 
discussion 
02/12/2010 1hr 20 
mins 
29 Community 
leaders 
Sudanese  14 male and 2 female including 
subchiefs, Health and WASH 
committees, women's group, 
school headmaster, market traders 
group  
AE Focus group 
discussion 
13/05/2010 1hr 45 
mins 
Community members 
30 Women's 
group 
Sudanese F 3 members of the women's groups AS Semi-
structured 
interview 
11/05/2010 31 mins 
31 Farmers group Sudanese  54 male and 6 female farmers AE Focus group 
discussion 
26/03/2010 14 mins 
32 Widows Sudanese F 2 widows  AE Semi-
structured 
interview 
03/12/2010 35 mins 
33 Women's 
group 
Sudanese F 21 female members of a savings 
group 
AE Focus group 
discussion 
03/12/2010 25 mins 
34 Susannah Arek Sudanese F Elderly widow AE Semi-
structured 
interview 
04/12/2010 50 mins 
35 Kiir Bulo Sudanese M Elderly man (recently returned AE Semi- 04/12/2010 40 mins 
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*Key to site codes: 
AE - Aweil East 
AS - Aweil South 
J - Juba 
UK - London, UK  
from refugee camp in the north) structured 
interview 
Other agency staff 
36 Charlotte 
Scawen 
British F Deputy Country Director - Agency 
1 
J Unstructured 
interview 
03/01/2011 48 mins 
37 Alistair Punch British M Monitoring and Evaluation Officer - 
Agency 2 
J Unstructured 
interview 
27/04/2010 44 mins 
38 Anonymous Zimbabwean M Monitoring and Evaluation Officer - 
Agency 3 
J Unstructured 
interview 
16/12/2010 19 mins 
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Appendix C Diagrammatic representation of codes used for analysis 
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Appendix D Practical steps to implementation 
Taken from Tearfund‟s Quality Standards Field Guide, First Edition, December 
2009, these steps refer to the implementation of beneficiary accountability. 
Step 1: Obtain the informed consent of beneficiaries and ensure their ongoing 
participation from assessment through to implementation. 
Step 2: Set aside the resources needed – funds and staff – to support 
beneficiary accountability. 
Step 3: Make information on your organisation and your programme publicly 
available. 
Step 4: Ensure thorough induction, appraisal and development of staff. 
Step 5: Establish a system to hear and respond to feedback. 
Step 6: Monitor the accountability system and act on the feedback received. 
